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As the Federal Antimonopoly Service (www.anticartel.ru) notes, the most serious violation of antimonopoly legislation is anti-competitive agreements - most often they find their expression in the form of cartel agreements. The word “cartel” (from Italian carta - document) refers to a secret agreement between entrepreneurs competing within the same product market, aimed at obtaining excess profits and, as a result, infringing on the interests of consumers.
One of the most common forms of cartel agreement is price collusion during tenders. Currently, the bulk of trading takes place within the scope of Federal Law dated 04/05/2013 No. 44-FZ “On contract system in the field of procurement of goods, works, services to meet state and municipal needs" and the Federal Law of July 18, 2011 No. 223-FZ "On the procurement of goods, works, services certain types legal entities».
Price collusion during bidding is expressed in the conclusion by bidders (potential competitors) of an agreement on the conditions for obtaining a contract before the start of bidding. There are several possibilities to win the auction fraudulently, and all of them are known to the Federal Antimonopoly Service and there is an unambiguous established administrative and arbitrage practice, For example:
1) applications with the most advantageous offers prices are submitted by the participants in the conspiracy in turn,
2) bidders put forward unacceptable conditions or prices in advance (thus, the winner has no alternative),
3) bidders withdraw previously submitted bids without apparent reason,
4) in some cases, actions punishable by law are possible, such as blackmail and the use of violence against possible competitors.
In exchange for their “loss,” the “loser companies” receive another contract, a subcontract from the winner, or monetary or other compensation.
Among the violations that stand out are collusions and/or concerted actions during electronic auctions. FAS Russia is fighting against anti-competitive agreements within the framework of electronic auctions, which have various manifestations, but the most common are two schemes:
1) minimal price reduction on the part of one participant and “silence” of others;
2) concerted actions to sharply reduce the minimum price of a government contract, without the intention of subsequently concluding a government contract (the so-called “battering ram” scheme).
Anti-competitive agreements are identified both by the territorial departments of the FAS RF, the Central Asia of the FAS RF, and by other regulatory/law enforcement authorities (Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, FSB of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, etc.), for example:
- The Altai regional department of the Federal Antimonopoly Service brought administrative liability to two construction companies city of Barnaul for collusion at auctions. The case on grounds of violation of Art. 11 of the Law “On the Protection of Competition” (prohibition of competition-restricting agreements between business entities) was initiated on the basis of an analysis of materials received from the Investigative Department of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs for the city of Barnaul. As part of the auction with a declared value of more than 900 million rubles, as a result of an oral agreement reached, the auction participants applied an anti-competitive behavior strategy, which consisted in the fact that one of the participants refused competition and did not go to auction, thereby allowing the second participant to obtain the right to conclude a contract with a price lower than only 0.5% of that put up at the auction;
- The Moscow OFAS Russia found four auction participants to have violated clause 2, part 1, art. 11 of the Law on Protection of Competition. The total amount of the initial (maximum) prices of all contracts amounted to more than 16 million rubles. During the auctions, the participating organizations came to an agreement, which led to the maintenance of prices at the auction and allowed P. LLC. win bids in 3 auctions with a price reduction in two of them by 1.5% and in one by 3%. LLC "G." won the auction in 2 auctions with a price reduction of 3% and 3.5%, LLC Firma "A." won 2 auctions with a price reduction of 1.5% and 2% from the initial (maximum) contract price. The Department's specialists found that commercial organizations, competing with each other when participating in tenders, acted in each other’s interests - exchanged information, and used a single infrastructure when submitting price proposals;
- 04/21/2014 18 The Arbitration Court of Appeal supported the position of the Arbitration Court Orenburg region and recognized the decision of the Orenburg OFAS as legal.
The antimonopoly authority found that there were active, but not justified by a real intention to conclude a contract (the second parts of the bids obviously did not correspond to the auction documentation) actions of two parties to the agreement, expressed in the submission and maintenance of dumping price proposals to reduce the initial (maximum) price of the contract by 24. 87% and 25.37% respectively. In this connection, it became possible to conclude a contract with a third party to the agreement with a reduction in its price by 3.5% from the initial contract price. These actions were the result of an oral agreement implemented by these organizations aimed at coordinating their actions (group behavior) when participating in the auction. The actions of the parties to the agreement to submit dumping price proposals and artificially reduce the initial (maximum) price of the contract without the intention of concluding a contract were aimed at creating the appearance of competition and misleading the remaining participants in the auction. The result of this behavior was that the participant in this conspiracy concluded a contract with a price different from the initial (maximum) price by only 3.5%.
- On July 30, 2013, the Rostov OFAS Russia uncovered a conspiracy during participation in an auction for the maintenance of highways of regional and intermunicipal importance in the Azov and Kagalnitsky regions. The Rostov OFAS Russia commission found that the auction participants entered into agreements to maintain prices at the auction. As a result, despite the fact that four companies were allowed to participate, a price proposal was received from only one participant with a reduction in the original contract price of only 0.5%;
- 03/17/2014 Moscow OFAS Russia fined three companies for cartel conspiracy at a snow removal auction. The total amount of fines imposed was 79.4 million rubles, with the initial (maximum) contract price exceeding 105 million rubles. The Department’s specialists established that commercial organizations did not compete with each other when participating in tenders, but acted in each other’s interests - they exchanged information, and used a single IT infrastructure when submitting price proposals.
- The Moscow OFAS made a decision according to which the individual entrepreneur and the persons included in the same group with her: LLC “S.” and LLC "B." found to have violated clause 2, part 1, art. 11 of the Law on the Protection of Competition by concluding and participating in an agreement that led to the maintenance of prices at auctions in open auctions in electronic form.
A group of persons during participation in open auctions in electronic form on trading platform CJSC Sberbank-AST in March 2011 did the following: two of the participants in the agreement, within a short period of time, alternately reduced the price of the lot by a significant amount until they were convinced that other participants in the auction, misled by such a strategy of behavior, did not abandon competition , after which, the third party to the agreement, in the last seconds of the auction, offered a price slightly lower than the price offered by bona fide auction participants, or the initial (maximum) contract price and became the winner of the auction.
The fact of the existence of an agreement between these persons is confirmed by the following circumstances. The individual entrepreneur is the general director of LLC "S." and LLC "B.", as well as sole founder the last one. Actual and legal address of LLC "S.", LLC "B." and IP coincide and the latter carries out its economic activity on premises belonging to to CEO LLC "S." and LLC "B." The specified persons, when participating in ongoing auctions, entered the site electronic platform from one IP address.
Thus, participation in the auction is a legally significant action for the auction participant; therefore, liability is provided for any actual actions performed during the auction. The behavior of the bidder must be reasonable, determined solely by objective external circumstances and aimed solely at achieving a transparent economic result. The exceptional importance of compliance with the norms and principles of antimonopoly legislation is due to the existence of liability for establishing an anti-competitive agreement, provided for in Article 14.32 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation, in the form of an administrative fine in the amount of 10% to 50% of the bidding value.
Moreover, in some cases, participants in anti-competitive agreements may be held criminally liable for committing a crime under Art. 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
19.08.09
For price fixing you can be imprisoned for 6 yearsAt least the antimonopoly authorities now have such powers. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev “untied” their hands by approving amendments to the Federal Law “On the Protection of Competition”, the Code of Administrative Offenses and Article 178 of the Criminal Code “Preventing, Restricting or Eliminating Competition”.
“Under certain conditions, an enterprise that owns even less than 35% of the market can now be considered a monopolist,” explains Anatoly Avdeev, head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service for the Penza Region. “In addition, a case can be opened against them even three years after the violation was discovered.”
Cartels or price collusion between enterprises in the same industry will be severely punished - for this you can end up in jail for three years.
“If previously we could endlessly fine the same company for unfair competition, now for the third violation the head of the enterprise faces 6 years in prison,” emphasizes Anatoly Ivanovich. “The officials involved may lose their positions.”
Another important innovation is that from now on, representatives of the antimonopoly service can conduct surprise checks and inspections of documents and premises at enterprises.
By the way, since the beginning of the year, 28 facts of violation of antimonopoly legislation have been identified in the Penza region. Large resource supply organizations were involved in them, oil companies, insurance companies.
INTERVIEW OF THE HEAD OF THE FAS RF I. ARTEMYEV
In connection with the entry into force of the “second antimonopoly package” of laws, the head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service, Igor Artemyev, answered pressing questions related to the application of these laws in practice.
From August 23, 2009, Russia will live under new antimonopoly legislation. What would you highlight as your main achievements?
2/3 of the laws are directed against unscrupulous officials who violate the rights of entrepreneurs. The adopted amendments significantly expand the possibilities for holding officials accountable for providing preferences to individual companies. These include large fines, a ban on the profession, and compensation to the state treasury for the damage caused. This means that for violating antimonopoly laws, an official may be prohibited from holding his position for 6 months to 3 years.
The laws significantly reduce the administrative burden on entrepreneurs. The threshold values of the assets of organizations that need to apply to the FAS for permission to complete a particular transaction are being raised.
Finally, this is the introduction of criminal liability for violation of antimonopoly legislation.
How has the definition of the concepts of monopoly high and low prices, which businesses are so concerned about, changed?
Now, when determining a monopolistically inflated price, it is used as cost method research (estimating the amount necessary expenses for the production of goods), and the “comparable markets method” (comparison with the price set in conditions of market competition).
A monopoly price is a price set by an economic entity occupying a dominant position if this price exceeds the amount of expenses and profits necessary for the production and sale of such a product and the price that was formed in conditions of competition on a comparable market. commodity market in the territory Russian Federation or beyond. That is, now, when determining the monopoly high price of a product, we can use both the cost research method (estimating the amount of costs and profits required to produce the product) and the “comparable markets method” (comparison with the price set under competitive conditions in a comparable market).
It is important to note that we specifically made a reservation: the price of a product resulting from innovation activity, that is, activities leading to the creation of a new non-fungible product or a new interchangeable product while reducing the costs of its production and (or) improving its quality.
Your proposal to remove the 35% threshold for market dominance has caused a lot of noise. What is its meaning?
If largest company begins to dictate its terms in the market and everyone else is forced to adapt to it, then the actions of such a company may be regarded as violating antitrust laws. But if available certain conditions. For example, if an entity can have a decisive influence on the promotion of a competitor’s product on the market and limits it. Thus, the 35 percent threshold for dominance by market power, which was fixed earlier, has been practically removed. But it’s up to us to prove that the company occupies exactly this position.
Nowhere in the world does the 35% threshold exist. Either you abuse your behavior and limit competition, or you don’t. And the share is assessed through market power and through the ability to really influence pricing policy in a specific market. However, it is important that for those companies that violate the law, but whose share is less than 35%, turnover fines will not be applied.
Who will be primarily affected by the “second antimonopoly package” of laws?
First of all, officials and top managers of companies. If you look at the industry perspective, then the markets for petroleum products, medicines, and food products.
How will amendments to the law help combat such a malicious violation as cartel collusion?
Cartels cause enormous harm to the country’s economy and citizens and are now punishable by a “negotiable” fine for companies. At the same time, we have provided the opportunity to avoid punishment for those companies that voluntarily declared to the FAS their participation in anti-competitive agreements and refused further participation in them. This is the so-called “mitigation of responsibility” program. Over the past 2 years, 300 companies have used this program. We released all companies that came to us from liability. We managed to clear the markets of cartels, this is especially noticeable in the financial markets. But the transition period is ending. Now only the first company that contacts us will be exempt from punishment. The rest will be punished to the maximum - turnover fines.
This practice applies in the United States and the European Union. It is from the first participant in the conspiracy who contacted the antimonopoly authorities that we receive maximum assistance in uncovering the conspiracy scheme; the rest will not tell us anything new. However, today they too are exempt from responsibility, so they feel impunity.
Will the introduction of criminal liability make it easier to uncover cartel conspiracies?
Undoubtedly. We expect that when some of the conspirators go to prison, many entrepreneurs engaged in illegal practices today will stop breaking the law. It’s one thing when a company faces a turnover fine. It’s another matter when you yourself can go to jail for violating antitrust laws.
We hope that now company leaders will think a hundred times before entering into a cartel agreement and this will help reduce the number of violations in the markets.
What is the harm of cartels and concerted actions in the market?
If someone increases the price, then it is right for the company economic behavior If they didn’t raise their own, the consumer would go to them for their goods, and not where it’s more expensive. And concerted action is when everyone acts in the same economic interest against the consumer and raises prices one after another. The consumer is left with no choice, no opportunity to buy the product cheaper.
For example, the European Court responded to this: such actions to extract excess profits are not justified in any way, and the punishment will be the same as for cartels.
And, for example, the budget suffers from collusion in bidding when, due to the coordinated actions of economic entities or economic entities and authorities, a government contract is sold at the highest possible price.
Does the entry into force of a criminal measure mean that the FAS will have new powers for operational investigative activities?
No, the main sanctions of the FAS Russia will be economic character. Issues of disqualification will be resolved only by the judiciary. The antimonopoly authority has the right to investigate the location of possible violations and crimes. FAS Russia can contact law enforcement agencies, primarily in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and include its employees in the commissions of the FAS Russia. During inspections, all operational actions will be carried out by law enforcement officers.
In terms of access to documentation, are your powers now, with the adoption of the second antimonopoly package, becoming comparable to the powers of fiscal officials?
In terms of access, yes, that’s roughly how we were guided.
Exactly what the tax service and customs or the Central Bank have in relation to banks.
And if compared with world systems, then we, of course, remain much weaker. All global antimonopoly authorities have the right to conduct operational investigative activities; they are all law enforcement agencies. We are the only ones without such rights.
But we have never demanded it for ourselves and will never demand it. Russian specifics is such that we need to be very careful in what we do. We already have really serious weapons in our hands.
So we don’t need operational investigative activities; that’s what the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the prosecutor’s office are for.
What sanctions will a violator of antimonopoly legislation face with the entry into force of amendments to the criminal code?
The article establishes criminal liability for anti-competitive actions: price collusion, repeated abuse of a dominant position.
The law provides for fines from 300 thousand to 500 thousand rubles or imprisonment for up to 3 years for preventing, restricting or eliminating competition by concluding competition-restricting agreements or concerted actions.
Also punishable will be repeated abuse of a dominant position, expressed in establishing and maintaining a monopoly high (low) price for a product, as well as for acts that entailed “causing major damage to citizens, organizations or the state or resulted in the extraction of income on a large scale.”
Amendments to the Criminal Code were prepared by the service in order to implement the principle of inevitability of responsibility for socially dangerous violations of antimonopoly legislation.
What damage will be considered major?
Damage will be recognized as large if its amount “exceeds one million rubles,” and “large income” is considered to be a benefit in excess of 5 million rubles. An offense committed by a person more than twice within three years, “for which such person was brought to administrative responsibility,” is considered a repeated offense.
For the same acts committed using official position involving the destruction or damage of someone else’s property, or the threat of its destruction, or causing particularly large damage (more than 3 million rubles) or resulting in the extraction of income on a particularly large scale (more than 25 million rubles), will have to be spent in prison for up to 6 years years and pay a fine of up to 1 million rubles or in the amount of the convicted person’s salary for a period of up to five years.
Isn't the punishment too harsh - up to six years?
This is an extreme measure, and it will be applied by court decision to persistent violators of antimonopoly legislation and repeat offenders. In conditions of insufficient development of individual markets, from a competition point of view, this amendment will be very useful for the development of healthy competitive conditions.
Is there any exemption from criminal liability?
An offender may be released from criminal liability if he contributed to the detection of a crime, compensated for the damage caused or transferred income received as a result of his actions to the federal budget, and if his actions do not contain another crime.
Thus, with the entry into force of amendments to the criminal code, penalties for violations of competition law, which until now were punishable by fines, are seriously tightened. The FAS believes that these measures will help influence price fluctuations that are the result of cartel agreements.
When will amendments to the criminal code come into force?
On July 29, 2009, President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev signed amendments to the draft federal law “On Amendments to Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.” After 90 days, the amendments will come into force and the antimonopoly authority will be able to apply them in practice.
How can a business protect its rights from the FAS?
All our decisions are suspended from the moment they are appealed in court. Businesses have the right to defend their interests and prove their case in court.
Do you have further plans to modernize legislation?
FAS Russia will begin to develop the so-called. "third package of laws." The main idea of the bill is the formation of a system of legislative regulation of the activities of natural monopolies, ensuring reliable, efficient and high-quality provision of goods and services to consumers, increasing the transparency of the activities of natural monopolies, as well as creating conditions for the development of competition.
For these purposes, a number of significant changes and additions to the legislation on natural monopolies are proposed.
Based on materials from the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation, www.fas.gov.ru
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Conspiracy in its entirety: how Russia’s largest cartel workedFAS announced the disclosure of the largest cartel in Russia. According to the department, dozens of textile factories have united to participate in bidding for the supply of clothing for the needs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB and customs at total amount RUB 3.5 billion
During the investigation, the FAS examined the actions of 118 companies, 90 of them were found guilty of violating the law on the protection of competition, the FAS said in a statement. “Some of these companies are affiliated with each other,” said a representative of the FAS press service.
According to the department, 18 open auctions were held under conditions of collusion for a total amount of more than 3.5 billion rubles. “These are almost all sewing workers who Lately participated in competitions for the supply of clothing for the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” said RBC director one of the enterprises accused of cartel conspiracy. The head of the FAS department for combating cartels, Andrei Tenishev, confirmed this information to RBC, making the reservation that there were several companies whose involvement in the cartel could not be proven.
“Price proposals were submitted more often by one organization, despite the fact that from 11 to 40 organizations participated in the auction, the rest refused to fight to ensure victory for the “right” participant and maintain prices,” notes a message on the FAS website. Cartel participants developed a system of “quotas” for participants in the conspiracy; “quotas” were calculated taking into account the initial price of the contract in proportion to the number of participants, Andrey Tenishev said.
“Quotas” could be obtained, exchanged or accumulated. After accumulating a certain amount and reaching agreements with the rest of the cartel participants, one of the conspirators could become a “contract holder” for the auction,” explains Tenishev. The confessions of some of its participants, who testified under conditions of release from liability, helped reveal the scheme of the FAS cartel. In addition, according to Tenishev, evidence of the conspiracy was provided by correspondence between the participants in the conspiracy, in which they discussed who would win a particular tender, as well as the fact that some applications from various participants in the competition were submitted from the same IP addresses.
As reported to RBC by the FAS, the eight largest participants in the cartel are the Moscow clothing company Optima and the Paris Commune clothing factory, the St. Petersburg Baltic Manufactory, Clothes and Fashion and the State Unitary Enterprise Biser from the Ivanovo region, and the Kizelovsk clothing factory. "Initiative" from the Perm Territory, the "Nadezhda" company from the Nizhny Novgorod region and LLC "Production and Sewing Association "Yuzhanka" (Rostov region).
The website of the Paris Commune reports that the factory produces underwear knitwear, as well as camouflage synthetic knitwear “Digital”, on orders from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Among the customers of the Baltic Manufactory, along with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, are the Ministry of Emergency Situations and federal Service security (FSO). According to orders from law enforcement agencies, she sews summer and winter uniforms, raincoats, wind and waterproof suits, raincoats and camouflage suits. PShO "Yuzhanka" produces various types of clothing from woolen fabrics for privates and officers of the Ministry of Defense, FSB and Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ivanovo Clothing and Fashion CJSC, as reported on the company’s website, specializes in the production of pea coats, tunics and trousers, as well as coats made of woolen fabrics for rank and file and officers of state law enforcement agencies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the Federal Security Service and the Ministry of Defense. The list of products from the Ivanovo State Unitary Enterprise “Biser” mentions signal vests, capes, windbreakers, caps and suits for traffic police and emergency services employees.
Representative largest holding light industry Russia - BTK group of companies Taimuraza Bolloeva, one of the main activities of which is the production of uniforms, said that BTK has nothing to do with the situation and has not received any orders from the FAS related to the law on protection of competition. Andrey Tenishev confirmed the absence of claims against BTK.
According to SPARK-Marketing, since 2011, companies accused of collusion have entered into contracts with the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the supply of clothing, shoes, sleeping bags, bed linen and other clothing items worth more than 7 billion rubles. The most profitable year for these companies was 2015, when they won tenders worth 3 billion rubles.
It was during this period that purchases were made, during the inspection of which antimonopoly officers discovered collusion, the director of one of the enterprises accused of participating in the cartel told RBC.
“Yes, we did not participate in any conspiracy. I don’t even know many of these companies,” says Mikhail Kapitov, general director of the Yuzhanka association, indignantly.
“The FAS found information from someone with a list of companies where shares were indicated,” says the director of an enterprise accused of cartel conspiracy, on condition of anonymity. - But let's look at it from the other side. No one will fulfill a contract worth several hundred million rubles for one person. There is a contract holder, and the rest work with him on a subcontract. This is generally normal practice.”
The press service of the FAS RBC clarified that an administrative case will be initiated against companies found guilty of violating the competition law, under which they face a fine of 10 to 50% of the initial maximum bidding value. “The decision regarding officials to initiate criminal proceedings against them will be made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” the FAS press service told RBC.
In an interview with the RBC TV channel, Tenishev said that the antimonopoly service believes that the collected data indicates a criminal cartel and signs of a criminal community. “It is under these two articles - 178 and 210 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - that we will ask the Ministry of Internal Affairs to initiate a criminal case,” Tenishev said.
Creating the appearance of competition at auctions in Russia is not uncommon, Sergei Vodolagin, managing partner of Westside Advisors, comments on the situation. According to him, the distribution of roles between bidders falls under clause 2, part 1, article 11 of the Federal Law “On Protection of Competition”, being, in fact, a type of cartel agreement. “For legal entities, administrative liability is provided in the form of large fines. Individuals can be brought not only to administrative, but also to criminal liability, notes Vodolagin. - IN in this case, when contracts were concluded for billions of dollars, bringing the perpetrators (usually managers) to criminal liability is very likely if law enforcement agencies manage to prove their guilt. Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Restriction of Competition” provides for, in the event of particularly large damage (in relation to this article - 30 million rubles) caused by a cartel agreement, maximum liability in the form of imprisonment for a term of up to six years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions for a period up to three years."
We present to your attention an analytical review “The use of circumstantial evidence in cases of bid rigging.”
Anti-competitive agreements to increase, reduce or maintain prices at auctions, prohibited by paragraph 2 of part 1 of Article 11 of the Federal Law of July 26, 2006 No. 135-FZ “On the Protection of Competition” (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Protection of Competition), are the most common type of cartels. More than half of all cartel cases are initiated based on bid rigging.
However, in practice there is no uniform standard of proof for such anti-competitive agreements. The most pressing issue in this regard is the use of indirect evidence when there are significant differences in the approaches of the antimonopoly authority and the courts.
1. Approach of the antimonopoly authorities
When considering cases of bid rigging, antimonopoly authorities apply the position developed by the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia that it is necessary to accept not only direct evidence, but also “the necessary totality of indirect evidence.” This means that the conclusion about the presence of a prohibited agreement in the actions of the subjects of a prohibited agreement can be made through the result of the alleged agreement, without reference to any direct evidence of the guilt of the persons.
This approach is actively implemented in administrative practice. Thus, from an analysis of the decisions of the antimonopoly authorities, the following facts and circumstances can be identified on which the accusations of a bidding cartel are based:
- absence of proposals from auction participants on the contract price until the auction step has decreased to the minimum;
- location of bidders at the same address;
- registration of key certificates digital signature accused companies for the same thing individual ;
- submitting an application from one IP address and/or accounts on which application files were created and modified;
- conclusion of a supply/subcontract agreement between the winner and one of the bidders;
- resale of the subject of the auction between participants who submitted bids for the auction, and the refusal of the seller to participate in them;
- meeting of officials of competing companies on the eve of trading;
- failure to reduce the offer price to the level specified in the official’s testimony.
Thus, the antimonopoly authority proceeds from the fact that the fact of collusion in bidding is proven by any factual circumstances confirming that commercial organizations that must compete with each other during bidding acted in the interests of each other or one of the participants.
2. Approach of ships
Judicial practice is not as uniform as administrative practice. Currently, there is no uniformity among courts on whether bid rigging cases can be decided solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Some courts support the FAS of Russia and accept all evidence from the antimonopoly authorities. Other courts, on the contrary, refuse to confirm the above position of the FAS Russia.
Thus, in the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Ural District dated August 2, 2011 No. F09-4563/11 in case No. A76-14962/2010, the court indicated that the mere fact of lack of activity among auction participants cannot indicate their collusion.
In the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Ural District dated March 15, 2013 No. F09-315/13 in case No. A60-23089/2012, the court indicated that the antimonopoly authority did not prove the mutual awareness of auction participants about each other’s actions, their interest in the result of such actions, as well as the disconnection of these actions from objective circumstances that equally affect all economic entities. The court considered the plaintiff’s argument about not reducing the offer price due to unprofitability to be justified.
In the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Central District dated May 30, 2013 in case No. A64-4201/2012, the court indicated that the behavior of bidders, expressed in the absence of price offers for a contract, in itself is not unconditional evidence of the existence of an agreement between business entities. These arguments were confirmed in the Ruling of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation on the refusal to transfer the case to the Presidium dated September 16, 2013 No. VAS-10923/13.
By the decision of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated March 31, 2014 No. VAS-3861/14 in case No. A40-92025/2012, the transfer of the case to the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation was refused, since the lower courts correctly concluded that the existence of an anti-competitive agreement between the companies was not proven.
At the same time, some courts accept circumstantial evidence as sufficient, basing the decision on the factual circumstances of the case.
Thus, the Resolution of the FAS of the East Siberian District dated March 25, 2014 in case No. A74-2372/2013 confirmed the legality of the decision of the antimonopoly authority due to the fact that the applicants, before holding auctions and competitions, had previously taken part in other tenders for the right to conclude similar state contracts and were aware of each other's actions.
In the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Moscow District dated April 22, 2013 in case No. A40-94475/12-149-866, the court considered that the actions of business entities led to the conclusion of a government contract at the highest possible price, and recognized as proven the fact of reaching an oral agreement, although in the case there was no direct evidence of the subjects' guilt.
In the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North Caucasus District dated April 3, 2013 in case No. A53-21732/2012, the court concluded that the behavior of business entities that incurred costs to participate in the auction, but did not actually take part in it, was illogical. As a result, the court recognized that the actions of the participants were aimed at maintaining the price at the auction, limited competition in setting a competitive price and created a situation that entailed insufficient savings of budgetary funds.
Similar decisions were made by the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Far Eastern District dated November 5, 2013 No. F03-5209/2013 in case No. A59-5489/2012, and by the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the West Siberian District dated November 6, 2013 in case No. A70-139/2013.
3. Conclusions and recommendations
A general analysis of law enforcement practice shows that it is becoming increasingly difficult to challenge decisions of antimonopoly authorities on bid rigging: courts quite often support the position of the FAS Russia and accept indirect evidence. This is probably due to the nature of the offense itself, because bid rigging directly leads to an increase in the cost of government contracts and, as a consequence, to the ineffective use of budget funds.
Recently, we were contacted by a group of legal entities in respect of which the antimonopoly authorities initiated an inspection to determine if there were signs of consistency in their actions in order to obtain economic effect when participating in tenders - a cartel conspiracy or cartel agreement.
I will say right away that the case was successfully completed. I will not cite the materials of the inspection, since the case was not brought to court, and the ongoing inspection showed that there were no signs of illegal actions. In addition, there is a privacy policy.
Nevertheless, during the audit, some recommendations were developed based on judicial practice in similar cases.
The antimonopoly authority (FAS) can conduct desk and field inspections, scheduled and unscheduled. Inspections for the presence of cartel agreements are usually carried out suddenly and unscheduled. At the same time, checks for the presence of a cartel agreement occur suddenly, i.e. without warning (Article 11 of the Law on Protection of Competition).
Video about cartel collusion during tenders and review of judicial practice Grounds for the FAS inspectionThe basis for conducting an inspection may be (Article 25.1 of the Law on Protection of Competition):
- materials received from authorities;
- messages and statements from individuals and legal entities, media reports indicating signs of violation of antimonopoly legislation;
- expiration of the deadline for execution of an order issued as a result of consideration of a case of violation of antimonopoly legislation, or in the exercise of state control over economic concentration;
- instructions of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation;
- detection by the antimonopoly authority of signs of violation of antimonopoly legislation.
In accordance with Art. 11 of the Law on Protection of Competition, cartel agreements are agreements between competitors in the same market if such an agreement may lead to:
- establishing or maintaining prices, tariffs, discounts, surcharges, surcharges, markups;
- increasing, decreasing or maintaining prices at auctions;
- division of the commodity market on a territorial basis, the volume of sales or purchases of goods, the range of goods sold or the composition of sellers or buyers (customers);
- reduction or cessation of production of goods;
- refusal to enter into contracts with certain sellers or buyers (customers).
Both “horizontal” and “vertical” agreements are prohibited. In cases provided for by law, vertical agreements may be permissible (Article 12 of the Competition Law).
Other agreements that may restrict competition are prohibited. Coordination is also prohibited economic activity economic entities.
The agreement does not recognize actions based on a joint activity agreement and actions as part of dependent groups.
Concerted actionThe Competition Law defines what constitutes “concerted actions” of business entities. It is assumed that no formal agreement has been concluded between the subjects, but the actions of the persons are coordinated.
In accordance with Art. 8 of the law, concerted actions of economic entities are the actions of economic entities on the product market in the absence of an agreement, satisfying the totality of the following conditions:
- the result of such actions corresponds to the interests of each of these economic entities;
- the actions are known in advance to each of the economic entities participating in them in connection with the public statement of one of them about the commission of such actions;
- the actions of each of these economic entities are caused by the actions of other economic entities participating in concerted actions, and are not a consequence of circumstances that equally affect all economic entities in the relevant product market.
In practice, a cartel agreement may look like this:
Two business entities participate in bidding for the right to conclude a contract on the side of the contractor. According to the terms of the auction, the maximum contract price is determined. The first business entity offers to fulfill the contract with a price reduction of 0.5%, the second entity offers to fulfill the contract with a price reduction of 1%. The contract is won by the person who offers more low price. At the same time, the price was maintained at the highest possible level. As a result, the losing party often becomes a subcontractor of the winning bidder. This scheme can be done many times.
Here's another example:
Applications for participation in the auction are submitted in two stages. At the first stage, a person submits bids with an offer price 70-80% lower than the contract value. After which these persons cannot go through the second stage of submitting documents for participation in the auction. As a result, the winner of the auction is the person who offered the maximum price.
Thus, manipulations occur in order to maintain high prices and fight competitors.
What do the courts pay attention to and what circumstances confirm the existence of a cartel? Printouts of messagesPrintouts of email messages, information from hard drives and other media, certified by the antimonopoly authority, which received these materials during its inspection, are appropriate evidence in cases of violation of antimonopoly legislation.
A cartel agreement does not have to be in writingThus, an agreement within the meaning of antimonopoly legislation can be recognized as an agreement in any form, which may be evidenced by information contained in the documents of business entities, coordinated and targeted actions (inaction) of these entities, consciously making their behavior dependent on the behavior of other market participants, committed by them on a specific product market, falling under the criteria of restricting competition and capable of leading to results determined by the law on the protection of competition.
Submitting bids from one IP addressIn the case (No. A20-3765/2015), signs of violation of antimonopoly legislation were identified in the actions of business entities, expressed in bid rigging by submitting applications for participation in electronic auction from one computer, reducing the initial contract price by only 0.5% by each auction participant, therefore maintaining the initial maximum price.
A request was sent to the operator of the electronic platform to provide information about the procurement participants, information about the IP addresses from which the entrance to the electronic platform was carried out. From the information provided by the ETP operator, it follows that the applications came from one IP address from one computer.
Based on the results of the inspection, a decision was made on violation of clause 2, part 1, article 11 of the law on the protection of competition. The violation was expressed in the conclusion of an oral cartel agreement (cartel agreement), the implementation of which led to price maintenance during the electronic auction.
The courts found that the model of behavior at auctions was used by violators more than once, cases of joint participation in auctions from one IP address and one computer, according to data obtained from electronic trading platforms, there are more than three hundred.
Thus, the violators acted to maintain the price at the auction.
In the case (A32-42603/2014), it was established that price offers from three formally independent business entities were submitted from the same IP address. Taken together, a conclusion was made about the relationship of these persons when participating in the auction and about the consistency of their actions when participating in the auction.
Identity of application texts. Linguistic expertiseIn the case (No. A20-3765/2015), a linguistic examination (research) was carried out to determine the similarity of the first parts of applications for participation in the auction. The study showed that the texts of the applications are identical in content, composition and contain spelling and punctuation features that are not normative or typical for these texts. Thus, it was concluded that the actions of the violators were coordinated.
It is worth noting that the identity of the texts of the initial applications cannot independently indicate signs of a cartel agreement, since the same freely available samples could have been used in preparing the application.
Consistency of actions can be established even in the absence of documentary evidence. Uniformity and synchronization of actions (N A01-601/2016)According to paragraph 2 of the resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated June 30, 2008 No. 30 “On some issues arising in connection with the application of antimonopoly legislation by arbitration courts”, when analyzing the question of whether the actions of economic entities on the commodity market are coordinated (Article 8 Law on the Protection of Competition), arbitration courts should take into account the fact that coordination of actions can be established even in the absence of documentary evidence of an agreement to perform them. The conclusion about the presence of one of the conditions to be established for recognizing actions as coordinated, namely: the commission of such actions was known in advance to each of the economic entities, can be made based on the actual circumstances of their commission.
Consistency of actions (cartel agreement) can be evidenced by the commission of such actions uniformly and synchronously in the absence of objective reasons.
Lack of intention to compete. Simulation of competitionThus, in one case (No. A01-601/2016), the antimonopoly authority established signs of concluding and participating in a cartel agreement, which led to the refusal of one of the participants to participate in the auction and maintaining the maximum price at the auction in the interests of one of the participants.
To achieve the goal, a model of group behavior was used, which was expressed in the use of dumping offers. In fact, two entities reduced the contract price by more than 50%, which forced one of the participants (not a participant in the cartel) to refuse to participate in the auction. At the same time, bidders who declared a price more than 50% lower than the original price did not submit the necessary package of documents, which led to the victory in the auction of the person (the third participant in the cartel conspiracy) who declared the maximum price in the absence of real competition.
At the same time, nothing prevented the person who offered the price of the contract to be more than 50% lower than the original one from signing the contract based on the results of the auction, however, the specified participant filed a complaint against the actions of the customer’s auction commission for the unreasonable recognition of his application as conforming, which in itself is fact indicating that the purpose of participation in the auction is for of this participant was not a victory and the conclusion of a contract, but a reduction in the contract price to the level of unprofitability of performing work for bona fide participants.
In another case (A74-12668/2016), two business entities implemented a single behavioral strategy aimed at maintaining prices at an auction when the winner was predetermined between them. Participation in the auction was aimed at creating the appearance of competition. As a result of this strategy of behavior with minimal risks, these business entities receive a guaranteed maximum benefit, corresponding to the interests of each of them.
Liability for violation of antimonopoly legislation Art. 51 competition laws... a person whose actions (inaction) in the manner prescribed by law are recognized as monopolistic activity or unfair competition and are unacceptable in accordance with antimonopoly legislation, by order of the antimonopoly authority, is obliged to transfer to the federal budget the income received from such actions (inaction). In case of failure to comply with this requirement, income received from monopolistic activities or unfair competition is subject to recovery into the federal budget at the request of the antimonopoly authority. A person who has been issued an order to transfer to the federal budget income received from monopolistic activities or unfair competition cannot be held administratively liable for violating the antimonopoly legislation in respect of which this order was issued, if this order is executed.
Art. 14.322. The conclusion by an economic entity of an agreement that is unacceptable in accordance with the antimonopoly legislation of the Russian Federation, if such an agreement leads or may lead to an increase, decrease or maintenance of prices at auction, or the conclusion of an agreement that is unacceptable in accordance with the antimonopoly legislation of the Russian Federation between the organizers of the auction and (or) customers with participants in these tenders, if such an agreement has the purpose or leads or may lead to restriction of competition and (or) the creation of preferential conditions for any participants, or participation in them - entails the imposition of an administrative fine on officials in the amount of twenty thousand up to fifty thousand rubles or disqualification for up to three years; for legal entities - from one tenth to one second of the initial cost of the auction item, but not more than one twenty-fifth of the total amount of the offender’s proceeds from the sale of all goods (works, services) and not less than one hundred thousand rubles.
5. Coordination of economic activities of business entities, which is unacceptable in accordance with the antimonopoly legislation of the Russian Federation, shall entail the imposition of an administrative fine on citizens in the amount of forty thousand to fifty thousand rubles; for officials - from forty thousand to fifty thousand rubles or disqualification for up to three years; for legal entities - from one million to five million rubles.
IN arbitration court a case was considered (No. A20-3765/2015), where the FAS brought a legal entity to administrative liability under Art. 14.32 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation in the form of a fine in the amount of 23,626,025 rubles.
Art. 14.33 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (Unfair competition)The article provides for liability for failure to comply with the legal requirements of the antimonopoly authority.
Art. 19.8 of the Code of Administrative OffensesThat's all! I hope that the article was useful to you!
We present to your attention an analytical review “The use of circumstantial evidence in cases of bid rigging.”
Anti-competitive agreements to increase, reduce or maintain prices at auctions, prohibited by paragraph 2 of part 1 of Article 11 of the Federal Law of July 26, 2006 No. 135-FZ “On the Protection of Competition” (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Protection of Competition), are the most common type of cartels. More than half of all cartel cases are initiated based on bid rigging.
However, in practice there is no uniform standard of proof for such anti-competitive agreements. The most pressing issue in this regard is the use of indirect evidence when there are significant differences in the approaches of the antimonopoly authority and the courts.
1. Approach of the antimonopoly authorities
When considering cases of bid rigging, antimonopoly authorities apply the position developed by the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia that it is necessary to accept not only direct evidence, but also “the necessary totality of indirect evidence.” This means that the conclusion about the presence of a prohibited agreement in the actions of the subjects of a prohibited agreement can be made through the result of the alleged agreement, without reference to any direct evidence of the guilt of the persons.
This approach is actively implemented in administrative practice. Thus, from an analysis of the decisions of the antimonopoly authorities, the following facts and circumstances can be identified on which the accusations of a bidding cartel are based:
- absence of proposals from auction participants on the contract price until the auction step has decreased to the minimum;
- location of bidders at the same address;
- registration of digital signature key certificates of the accused companies for the same individual;
- submitting an application from one IP address and/or accounts on which application files were created and modified;
- conclusion of a supply/subcontract agreement between the winner and one of the bidders;
- resale of the subject of the auction between participants who submitted bids for the auction, and the refusal of the seller to participate in them;
- meeting of officials of competing companies on the eve of trading;
- failure to reduce the offer price to the level specified in the official’s testimony.
Thus, the antimonopoly authority proceeds from the fact that the fact of collusion in bidding is proven by any factual circumstances confirming that commercial organizations that must compete with each other during bidding acted in the interests of each other or one of the participants.
2. Approach of ships
Judicial practice is not as uniform as administrative practice. Currently, there is no uniformity among courts on whether bid rigging cases can be decided solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Some courts support the FAS of Russia and accept all evidence from the antimonopoly authorities. Other courts, on the contrary, refuse to confirm the above position of the FAS Russia.
Thus, in the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Ural District dated August 2, 2011 No. F09-4563/11 in case No. A76-14962/2010, the court indicated that the mere fact of lack of activity among auction participants cannot indicate their collusion.
In the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Ural District dated March 15, 2013 No. F09-315/13 in case No. A60-23089/2012, the court indicated that the antimonopoly authority did not prove the mutual awareness of auction participants about each other’s actions, their interest in the result of such actions, as well as the disconnection of these actions from objective circumstances that equally affect all economic entities. The court considered the plaintiff’s argument about not reducing the offer price due to unprofitability to be justified.
In the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Central District dated May 30, 2013 in case No. A64-4201/2012, the court indicated that the behavior of bidders, expressed in the absence of price offers for a contract, in itself is not unconditional evidence of the existence of an agreement between business entities. These arguments were confirmed in the Ruling of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation on the refusal to transfer the case to the Presidium dated September 16, 2013 No. VAS-10923/13.
By the decision of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated March 31, 2014 No. VAS-3861/14 in case No. A40-92025/2012, the transfer of the case to the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation was refused, since the lower courts correctly concluded that the existence of an anti-competitive agreement between the companies was not proven.
At the same time, some courts accept circumstantial evidence as sufficient, basing the decision on the factual circumstances of the case.
Thus, the Resolution of the FAS of the East Siberian District dated March 25, 2014 in case No. A74-2372/2013 confirmed the legality of the decision of the antimonopoly authority due to the fact that the applicants, before holding auctions and competitions, had previously taken part in other tenders for the right to conclude similar state contracts and were aware of each other's actions.
In the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Moscow District dated April 22, 2013 in case No. A40-94475/12-149-866, the court considered that the actions of business entities led to the conclusion of a government contract at the highest possible price, and recognized as proven the fact of reaching an oral agreement, although in the case there was no direct evidence of the subjects' guilt.
In the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North Caucasus District dated April 3, 2013 in case No. A53-21732/2012, the court concluded that the behavior of business entities that incurred costs to participate in the auction, but did not actually take part in it, was illogical. As a result, the court recognized that the actions of the participants were aimed at maintaining the price at the auction, limited competition in setting a competitive price and created a situation that entailed insufficient savings of budgetary funds.
Similar decisions were made by the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Far Eastern District dated November 5, 2013 No. F03-5209/2013 in case No. A59-5489/2012, and by the Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the West Siberian District dated November 6, 2013 in case No. A70-139/2013.
3. Conclusions and recommendations
A general analysis of law enforcement practice shows that it is becoming increasingly difficult to challenge decisions of antimonopoly authorities on bid rigging: courts quite often support the position of the FAS Russia and accept indirect evidence. This is probably due to the nature of the offense itself, because bid rigging directly leads to an increase in the cost of government contracts and, as a consequence, to the ineffective use of budget funds.
06 June 2017
The head of the Pskov OFAS Olga Milonaets spoke about the scandalous road contracts between the companies of the Kukha brothers and the Pskov administration for almost half a billion rubles on the air of the Besedka program on local radio, the Pskov News Tape reported. We provide a transcript of this conversation on the pages of the veteran media in full.
Good afternoon, our guest is Olga Milonaets, head of the regional department of the Federal Antimonopoly Service. Olga Viktorovna, good afternoon.
Good afternoon.
Today we will talk about the resonant scandal that is flaring up around city road contracts. Let me remind you that next week the FAS department will consider a case initiated on the grounds of a cartel conspiracy. The focus is on the agreement between the Pskov administration and the companies Technodor and UDS Pskov, the founders of which were entrepreneurs associated with the Pskov authorities. I know that the Pskov OFAS has complaints about this contract. What is the essence of the claims, Olga Viktorovna, please explain to us.
I can’t say that this is a scandal for us. This is our ordinary work by virtue of our powers. We actually opened a case of conspiracy between the government and participants in the so-called “road auctions.” Now information is emerging that these are not exactly road auctions. Our UGH believes that this is an ordinary contract for 400 million rubles for washing curbs, for painting various fences and a little, it seems, for hundreds of millions for sealing cracks. Therefore, the customer says: “It is strange that this attracted the attention of the townspeople, and that our control over these auctions has increased.” He tries to present these auctions as something ordinary. But, nevertheless, we have a deputy’s appeal on this issue, and there is a lot of material in the press.
We have taken control of this situation and are now looking into it. It's not an easy matter. Two auctions, one for 264 million, the second for 183 million. The so-called twin firms won in turn. In one auction, the winner was UDS Pskov, which registered 11 days before the auction, and in the second auction, Technodor LLC, which also registered a few days before the auction.
What are we paying attention to now? I think that not only these two companies will be involved in our case. We have now decided to involve all organizations that participated in this auction. We will look at the behavior of each of the organizations, because the auction is quite a tasty morsel. Wash the curbs, paint the fences, somehow repair the cracks in the asphalt. This is the city center, Zavelichye, and Zapskovye
We want to clarify with the companies that also took part why they did not compete, why they did not business proposals. How did it happen that the companies took one “step” at a time, and victory was with these two organizations. We want to see at another auction why all the companies were removed, we will definitely see why they were removed. We will look at how security for the contract was filed for 13 and 11 million. We are undergoing a major review of the entire process.
Olga Viktorovna, in April the Pskov OFAS announced the initiation of a case against the organizer and participants of auctions for the maintenance of roads in Pskov. The department says there is evidence. I'd like to hear what the evidence is.
I can say that we had enough evidence to initiate a case. We initiate all cases based on signs of violations, signs of conspiracy. There are a couple of points, we have already outlined them, which may, under certain circumstances, indicate collusion between the companies and the customer. Those same stories that, strangely enough, were organized in 11 days precisely for these purposes, not yet knowing that there would be an auction. Why do the Kuhi brothers register two companies when there are other organizations that could take part in the auction? And here two offices are created specifically to participate in the auction, without having any technology, equipment, or staff. These are the first “bells”. The second is the behavior of campaign participants. The third thing is that all [applications] were withdrawn. In addition, we conducted an on-site inspection and inspected computers in the Pskov city administration together with the prosecutor's office. Everything that we are currently processing is not yet ready to bring to the surface. But, nevertheless, we are working on certain evidence.
Do I understand correctly that you are charging under Article 16 of the Competition Law? What kind of article is this?
This is a very proof-heavy article. Collusion between government authorities and business entities. It is clear that other security organizations may also have claims behind this economic clause. Therefore, we must understand the situation very carefully. Was there a conspiracy, or was it someone’s negligence, or an accidental coincidence, or a leak of information that we will or will not be able to prove. Quite serious complaints.
Based on your work experience, there are precedents when such processes end in a decision court decisions? Are the perpetrators punished? How difficult is this to prove?
Of course, there are such cases in the FAS practice. And in our practice there were such cases, as a rule, when, for example, land without bidding to any specific structure and when there are certain documents confirming that the parties have agreed on their actions - both the organizers and participants in the bidding exist. I can’t say that there are very many of them. As a rule, such cases are very successful when they are initiated by law enforcement agencies by transferring some data operational activities. My colleagues do not often, but such things happen.
And what threatens the violators if guilt is proven? And who will be responsible - an individual or a company directly?
As a rule, this is an official of the customer. In this case, it could be the UGC or the city administration, if there are still culprits. For business entities this is a legal entity. These are turnover fines. As a rule, very large. Percentage from 1 to 15 of the company’s turnover. We see that the companies were formed 11 days before participating in the auction; they have no turnover. The maximum fine that these companies can receive is 100 thousand rubles each. But, as a rule, we transfer Article 16 to law enforcement agencies. According to Article 178 of the Criminal Code, the conspiracy of the organizer and the conspiracy of the participants is sanctioned, and there the sanction is up to 5 years in prison.
The worst thing is that a criminal sentence cannot be ruled out.
Moreover, the amounts are decent. Our neighbors in the Novgorod region 4 or 5 years ago road works at a cost of just over 100 million, and the damage to the state was calculated precisely at the cost of the contract. People received real sentences, both from economic entities and from government agencies.
That is, both the customer - someone from the Pskov administration - and the direct executor - the founding company - could face a criminal sentence?
Yes, this is natural if this composition is proven.
Olga Viktorovna, have you had complaints about the company with the same founders before or is this the first time such complaints have been made?
There were certain complaints, but not about these participants. These founders were not found to have colluded. Naturally, we are now checking these facts, how the companies of these owners have participated in auctions for the last 2-3 years. We are now analyzing all this information.
You just cited the example of our neighbors and voiced one of the cases. I remember the statement of the Federal Antimonopoly Service that the road industry is one of the leaders in cartel agreements. Is it so?
Our central office, naturally, analyzes all the information. I think this is due to the fact that the biggest money in this industry and the biggest damage to the state is established in this market.
