“THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS P.A. Tsygankov * MORTON KAPLAN AND SYSTEM RESEARCH OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY The article is dedicated to the 55th anniversary ... "

Vestn. Moscow un-that. Ser. 25. International relations and world politics. 2012. No. 1

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

P.A. Tsygankov *

MORTON KAPLAN AND SYSTEM RESEARCH

INTERNATIONAL POLICY

The article is dedicated to the 55th anniversary of the publication of Morton's book

Kaplan's "System and Process in International Politics"

a noticeable influence on the development of international political theory.

An assessment of the typology proposed by M. Kaplan is given. international systems based on two main criteria - the number of actors and the power configuration, and the forms of political behavior of states in the field of international relations. The scientific contribution of M. Kaplan's work and the lessons that can be learned from the opposition of the "scientific" approach to the "traditional" are comprehended.

Key words: Morton Kaplan, theory of international relations, typology of international systems, systems modeling, power configuration, behaviorism.

Nowadays, it is difficult to imagine an analysis of interstate relations, world processes and even specific events in a particular region or country, not to mention research and attempts to forecast global politics, without referring to the foundations of a systems approach laid down in the work of Morton Kaplan “System and process in international politics ”, which was published more than half a century ago.

Today this study is no longer so widely known (in comparison, for example, with the works of G. Morgenthau, K. Waltz, St. Hoffman or J. Rosenau), but it would not be an exaggeration to say that its appearance left a significant imprint on the subsequent development of international political theory. ... It is no coincidence that already in the 1960s M. Kaplan's book caused a huge stream of special literature [see, for example: 6; 12; 14-17; twenty; thirty; 32], which forced the author to clarify and clarify his positions and approaches, which remain relevant today.

*** Morton Kaplan is one of the representatives of the Chicago School of Political Science, known for his contribution to the development of empirical research and the formation of behaviorist direction Lomonosov (e-mail: [email protected]).

laziness. The first generation of this school (1920-1930s), headed by C. Merriam and two of his colleagues, G. Gosnell and G. Lasswell, which became known as the ecological school, was strongly influenced by the sociological approach. Its representatives were skeptical about traditional historical and institutional directions, insisting on the need to introduce new research methods based on a more systematic and objective test of political science judgments by empirical data.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the contradictions between the supporters of the historical-institutional-legal (L. White and G. Pritchett) and the behavioral, or behaviouristic (A. Solberg, D. Greenstone and D. MacRoy) approaches again intensified.

G. Almond asserted: “It was a time when democracy was crushed on the European continent and when freedom of research and scientific research seemed to have a small future in the light of the developing events. And only after the Second World War, in the context of the great scientific revolution in nuclear physics and molecular biology, the impending rivalry with the USSR, which launched the satellite, behaviorism reached national and global proportions. ... In the early post-war decades, there were many necessary and sufficient reasons for the behaviorist revolution. "

Under these conditions, a group of so-called Young Turks headed by D. Easton, M. Kaplan and L. Binder came out in favor of strengthening the empirical component in political science. The ensuing discussion demanded a clarification of the philosophical foundations and general theoretical premises of the adherents of both directions. This second wave of the behaviorist movement found its supporters on a national scale, which was facilitated by innovative works, in particular, by authors such as H. Ilow, O. Early, W. Millet and G. Almond (representative of the first wave).

G. Almond, G. Powell, S. Verba and G. Ickstein became pioneers of empirical comparative research, and M. Kaplan and F. Schumann were among the first to apply this approach to the study of international relations [for more details see: 29].

Behaviorists have sought to discover uniformity and repetition in political behavior by systematically selecting and recording empirical data that are quantifiable and quantifiable. The results of such operations were to be used to test the validity of theoretical generalizations. At the same time, value judgments, questions of a philosophical nature, ethical assessments were to be considered analytically different from the process of empirical examination. The systems approach was entirely in keeping with this rationalistic tradition. He responded to both the methodological imperative of "modernism" - the use of quantitative research procedures and the formalization of scientific research, and the desire to create a general theory.

Already in the late 1950s, the costs of the positivist trend in political science seemed to have been successfully overcome. As S. Hoffman argued in 1959, "... all modern political science has a theoretical orientation, which is a reaction against the previous" hyperfactualism ", as well as the influence of the physical sciences, sociology, and communications sciences."

However, in the science of international relations, the discussion continued, receiving after 1966 the title of "the second big dispute", which affected precisely its theoretical orientation. Describing the views of a new generation of international experts, H.

Bull wrote:

“They strive for a theory of international relations, the provisions of which would be based on logical or mathematical evidence or on precise empirical verification procedures. Some of them believe that classical theories of international relations have no value, and imagine themselves to be the founders of a completely new science. Others believe that the results of the classical approach were of some value, and perhaps even treat them with a certain sympathy, like the one with which the owner of the newest car brand contemplates an old model. However, in both cases, they hope and believe that their own type of theory will completely supplant the classical type. "

Having put forward seven arguments in defense of the classical approach to the study of international relations, H. Bull paid special attention to the criticism of M. Kaplan's theory of international systems, arguing that the models of international systems formulated by him and the basic rules characteristic of the behavior of each of them are in fact nothing more than a "common place" gleaned from daily discussions about international relations and the general political structure that the world had or could have.

Responding to criticism, M. Kaplan emphasized that the basic concept of the "System and Process in International Politics"

simple enough. If the number, type and behavior of states change over time and if their military capabilities, economic resources and information also vary, then it is likely that there is some relationship between these elements, thanks to which systems with different structures and behavior can be distinguished. characteristic of different periods of history. This concept, the author argues, may not be entirely correct, but it does not seem devoid of sense for studying the issue of the influence of a particular type of international system on the foreign policy of states. To conduct such a study, systemic hypotheses about the nature of the relationships between variables are needed, and only after these hypotheses have been developed can history be studied in order to confirm or refute them. Without this, the researcher has no criterion on the basis of which he can choose from the infinite set of facts at his disposal. These initial hypotheses point to areas of evidence that are most relevant to this type of research. There is reason to think that if the hypotheses are wrong, it will become quite obvious when you try to use them.

“The main idea of ​​this work,” writes M. Kaplan, “is that the development of knowledge about politics is possible only when considering data about it in terms of systems of action. A system of action is a set of variable quantities that are different from the general parameters of the system and are interconnected in such a way that the described patterns of their behavior reflect the internal relationships of quantities with each other, as well as the relationship of a group of these quantities with a group of quantities that are outside the system under consideration. "

We are talking about a typology of international systems based on two main criteria: the number of actors and the power configuration. The results achieved by M. Kaplan allowed him to create such a typology and to distinguish, taking into account the specified criteria, six types of international systems, or, more precisely, six states of equilibrium of one superstable international system. At the same time, only two types correspond to the real history of international politics: the "balance of power system", in which only the main actors, i.e. states (or rather, great powers) have significant military and economic potential; and the "soft (flexible) bipolar system" (loose bipolar system), which includes, in addition to national actors (states), international intergovernmental organizations, i.e. supranational actors of international politics. This type of international system consists of both global, universal actors and actors belonging to one of two blocks.

Four other types of international systems, which are described in the work of M. Kaplan, are, in fact, some kind of ideal models that have never existed in reality. Thus, the "tight bipolar system" assumes that every actor that does not belong to either of the two blocks loses any noticeable influence or disappears. "Universal system"

(universal system), or "universal integrated system", is characterized by the fact that important power political functions are transferred from states to a universal (global) organization that has the right to determine the status of certain countries, allocate resources to them and monitor compliance with the agreed international rules. behavior. "Hierarchical system"

(hierarchical system) follows from the universal, taking the form of a world state, in which the role of specific countries is minimized. Finally, the "unit veto system" assumes that each actor (state or union of states) is able to exert an effective influence on overall international politics, since it has the ability (associated, for example, with the possession of nuclear weapons) to protect itself from any other states or coalitions of states.

This typology is not immutable. Subsequently, the author identified such variants of the “flexible bipolar system” as “very flexible bipolar system”, “discharge system” and “unstable block system”. As a variant of the "single veto system"

he also considered the model of a "partial nuclear proliferation system".

The typology of international political systems developed by M. Kaplan became one of the foundations, based on which, he deduced various types of political behavior of states in the field of international relations.

Having singled out for this purpose five types (models) of such behavior (associated with the criteria for organizing the decision-making process, the distribution of benefits from interaction, preferences when creating coalitions, the content and direction of political activity, as well as the ability to adapt to the conditions in which it is necessary to make decisions), the author proceeded to a direct examination of each of them, trying to show how the behavior of this or that actor will change depending on its type and the type of the international system.

Thus, unlike most researchers of his time, M. Kaplan is far from making references to history, considering the historical data to be too poor for theoretical generalizations.

Based on general systems theory and systems analysis, he constructs abstract theoretical models designed to contribute to a better understanding of international reality.

Proceeding from the conviction that the analysis of possible international systems presupposes the study of the circumstances and conditions in which each of them can exist or be transformed into a system of a different type, he asks questions about why this or that system develops, how it functions, how reasons is declining. In this regard, M. Kaplan names five variables inherent in each system: the basic rules of the system, the rules for the transformation of the system, the rules for the classification of actors, their abilities and information. The main ones, according to the researcher, are the first three variables.

"Basic rules" determine the relationship between actors, whose behavior depends not so much on the individual will and special goals of each, as on the nature of the system, of which they are components.

"Transformation rules" express the laws of systems change. Thus, it is known that in the general theory of systems the emphasis is placed on their homeostatic character - the ability to adapt to changes in the environment, i.e. self-preservation ability. Moreover, each model (or each type) of the system has its own rules of adaptation and transformation. Finally, the "rules for classifying actors" include their structural characteristics, in particular the hierarchy existing between them, which also influences their behavior.

According to M. Kaplan, the models constructed by him in his work "System and Process in International Politics" set a theoretical framework within which types of events that are seemingly unrelated to each other can be brought into relationship with each other. From his point of view, any theory includes: a) a set of basic terms, definitions, axioms; b) the formulation of provisions on their basis, which will have an unambiguous empirical justification; c) the possibility of verifying or falsifying these provisions using a controlled experiment or observation. At the same time, the researcher argued that for a preliminary, or initial, theory of international politics, the following are admissible: first, certain relaxation of these requirements;

secondly, the removal of the condition for confirming the logical sequence; thirdly, the lack of a clear, unambiguous interpretation of the terms and methods of "laboratory" verification of provisions.

The question is whether M. Kaplan, even with these restrictions, managed to come closer to the implementation of the modernist goal - the creation of a truly scientific theory of international relations, which will completely replace classical traditionalism.

In broad terms, it is quite obvious that M. Kaplan, like most of his other colleagues - representatives of the so-called scientific (scientistic) direction, rather shares the main provisions of classical political realism. Thus, he proceeds from the principle of the anarchy of international relations: “Since there is no judge who could keep such disputes within any given boundaries, it cannot be said that this system has full political status. In the modern international system, nation states have political systems, but the international system itself does not have such a status. The international system can be described as a zero-status system. "

The closeness of the researcher to realistic positions was also manifested in his interpretation of the main actors in international relations - these are the states, and, above all, great powers, according to M. Kaplan. He is also convinced that the realistic "doctrine based on the concept of" interest "is a fairly adequate description of the international system of" balance of power ", despite the fact that from time to time within the framework of this system of" sensation "(or" passion ") prevailed over "interest." Since the anarchy of international relations makes a clash of interests inevitable, they should be considered objective and viewed primarily in terms of military security. From the point of view of M. Kaplan, "there is no direct inclination of national actors to solidarity and cooperation, just as there is no transferable inclination that would force them to put the needs of other national actors above their own."

Of course, one cannot fail to see that one of the main provisions on which M. Kaplan's concept is based is the assertion of the fundamental role of the structure of the international system in the behavior of states. In this issue, the researcher not only joins canonical political realism, but also to a certain extent anticipates the theoretical constructions of neorealism. In addition, together with other modernists, he took another step forward compared to traditional realists, drawing attention to the relationship between foreign and domestic policy, which made it possible to enrich not only the factorial, but also the actor approach, including in the analysis, in addition to states, also sub-state and supranational actors. ... And yet, in general, M. Kaplan's theoretical constructions do not go far beyond the realist tradition.

The theory of systems modeling directly proposed by him also raises questions. M. Kaplan argues that there is no difference between the physical and the humanities when it comes to the need for empirical confirmation, and that along with empirical research, the systems theory of international politics requires the use of models. So, for example, from his point of view, one can imagine a computer connected to the information bank system, which receives information from spies about the upcoming actions of the enemy, analyzes them taking into account the previous actions of this enemy and builds models of his future behavior, which makes it possible to make decisions on measures to prevent them. However, in the words of H. Bull, it is the technique of constructing models that raises questions. Indeed, on the basis of what criteria did the author create such models, what is the measure of their severity and consistency, how do they correlate with the main previously formulated types of behavior of international actors? M. Kaplan's theory does not give answers to such questions.

In his desire to create a universal and indisputable knowledge about international relations, which would be similar to the natural sciences, M. Kaplan pays special attention to the comparison of theoretical models with historical international systems. At the same time, he is forced to admit the imperfection of this method of constructing a theory. “If the theoretical model is stable, but the historical system is unstable, then this means that the theory did not take into account some factor that has a certain impact. If both systems are stable, then there is a possibility that the reasons for this are different from those contained in the hypotheses. Possible answers to this question can be obtained either through a deeper study of private systems, or through additional comparative studies that will determine the differences in certain cases. Identifying coercive parameters would probably require more comparative studies. ” It is obvious, however, that such procedures do not give confidence in the final result, both because of the lack of clarity regarding their required number, and because of the unproven probability of repetition of the types of international behavior of political actors.

Modernists consider one of the important criteria for the scientific character of knowledge to be its objectivity, which requires the scientist to impartially assess and freedom from ideological judgments. Following this imperative, M. Kaplan even defines values ​​on the basis of needs and goals dictated by them, i.e. purely instrumental. However, this does not prevent him from expressing judgments of an exclusively ideological nature that defy any of the scientific criteria. For example, he claims that the USSR "was forced to enter the war on the side of the West."

Despite the small number of such provisions and the fact that they are by no means central from the point of view of the main problems of the book and its tasks, such statements cannot but undermine the credibility of the theoretical constructions of the author, who used the ideological clichés of Western media that impose anti-Soviet (and today - anti-Russian) myths. For science, such judgments are not of interest (logicians call them "useless"). Their purpose is different - to mobilize public opinion, to maintain it in a state of constant readiness to approve some foreign policy guidelines and reject others. With their gross historical falsehood, such statements once again confirm the illusory nature of the thesis about the possibility of an absolutely impartial, non-ideologized, free from any preferences and therefore a rigorous and purely scientific theory of international relations.

M. Kaplan proceeds from the position of the prescriptive function of the theory, which is quite logical for a representative of the "scientific" direction, postulating the limitless possibilities of empirically verifiable knowledge. In this regard, an important place in his book is given to the strategy, understood by the author as "the study of the restrictions that can be imposed on the rational choice of the opponent" or "consideration of the problems associated with predicting certain actions under given conditions."

The main tool for solving strategic problems, says M. Kaplan, can be game theory, which allows you to analyze various options for rational choice when making decisions in situations of certainty, uncertainty and risk. The researcher is convinced that this theory “is a fairly accurate instrument, which is based on quite clearly expressed provisions. In the areas in which it finds application, you can be sure that there are no mistakes (from the standpoint of common sense). In addition, knowledge of game theory is also important for the study of those problem areas where it has not yet been used. In these areas, in the absence of better analysis tools, game theory can be used to refine common sense. ”

However, it was the rational choice theories that prevailed in the Economics Department of the University of Chicago in the 1970s and then invaded political science, as well as all social sciences, in order to make them truly scientific, that became a significant challenge to the conceptual views of M. Kaplan. According to K. Monroe, supporters of rational choice theories criticized behaviorism and the system theory of inputs and outputs, which, from their point of view, is not very suitable for understanding the psychological characteristics of the decision-making process. Behavioralism, according to which outside observers can only distinguish behavior, ceased to satisfy many, and cognitive scientists (led by G. Simon, a representative of another Chicago school) joined economists in putting rational choice methodology at the forefront of political research in the 1970s. Ultimately, the important philosophical distinction between rational choice methodology and behaviorism was often virtually ignored. Behaviorists and supporters of rational choice theories united in resisting the attacks of postmodernists on "science", and the concepts of representatives of the second wave of the Chicago School were incorporated into ordinary common sense, in other words, they were dissolved in the theory of rational choice.

Thus, the conceptual constructions of M. Kaplan did not stand the test in two respects: they did not become a substitute (or at least one of the elements of replacement) for the "traditional" theory of international relations, and their "scientific character" turned out to be insufficient for the "rationality" of the supporters of the theory of games.

This does not mean, however, that M. Kaplan's work did not leave any traces, and his work was completely forgotten. The merit of the scientist is that he was one of the first to raise the question of the laws of functioning, change and comparative advantages of international systems of various configurations. The content of these laws is debatable, although the subject of such discussions, as a rule, is the same and concerns the comparative advantages of bipolar and multipolar systems.

So, R. Aron believed that the bipolar system contains a tendency to instability, since it is based on mutual fear and encourages both opposing sides to be rigid in relation to each other because of the opposite of their interests.

A similar opinion is expressed by M. Kaplan, arguing that the bipolar system is more dangerous, since it is characterized by the desire of counterparties to global expansion, presupposes a constant struggle between them either to maintain their positions or to redistribute the world. Of course, a multipolar balance of power system contains certain risks (for example, the risk of nuclear proliferation, the outbreak of conflicts between small actors, or the unpredictability of the consequences that changes in blocs between the great powers can lead to), but they do not compare with the dangers of a bipolar system.

Not limiting himself to such remarks, M.

Kaplan examines the “rules” of stability for bipolar and multipolar systems and identifies six rules, the observance of which by each of the poles of a multipolar system allows it to remain stable:

1) expand their capabilities, but better through negotiations than through war;

2) it is better to fight than not be able to expand your capabilities;

3) it is better to end the war than to destroy a great power, because there are optimal sizes of the interstate community (it is no coincidence that the European dynastic regimes believed that their opposition to each other had natural limits);

4) resist any coalition or individual nation trying to take a dominant position in the system;

5) to resist any attempts of this or that national state "to join the supranational international organizational principles", i.e. to spread the idea of ​​the need to subordinate states to any higher authority;

6) treat all great powers as acceptable partners; allow a defeated country to enter the system as an acceptable partner, or replace it by strengthening another, previously weak state.

It seems that these rules are derived inductively from the foreign policy of great powers (primarily the United States) and then (already deductively) are presented as general principles of their behavior in a multipolar system.

At the same time, it is obvious that the failure of the "winners" in the Cold War to comply with rule 3 and especially rule 6 (with the objective impossibility of fulfilling its third part), followed by persistent attempts to contain post-Soviet Russia on the way to great power, contributed to the chaos of the international system and a decrease in its security.

M. Kaplan also raised the question of the optimal number of poles in a multipolar system of balance of forces. Many believe that the greatest stability of such a system requires five great powers. According to M. Kaplan, this is the minimum limit, and the level of safety increases when the number of poles exceeds a certain upper limit, which has not yet been identified. Of course, this question has not found its theoretical solution (as, incidentally, the problem of the comparative degree of security of bi- and multipolar systems) and is unlikely to find on the way of system modeling. However, its very formulation and discussion, initiated by the work of M. Kaplan, contribute to the development of the theory of international relations, since, on the one hand, they reveal many other theoretical problems, and on the other hand, they warn against one-sided conclusions and decisions based on them.

Among the merits of M. Kaplan is the use of the sociological approach in the study of international relations.

Analysis in terms of interest groups, role functions, cultural factors gave him the opportunity to go beyond the one-sided statist approach: he not only distinguished several types of national, supranational and subnational actors, but also identified signs of social invasion, albeit within the framework of a hypothetical model of a hierarchical international system :

"... the rules of the hierarchical system are carried over mainly to functional actors such as trade unions, industrial organizations, police organizations and organizations within the health sector." Turning to a sociological approach allowed the scientist, albeit contrary to the general logic of rational choice, to notice that "national actors can behave as irrationally and inconsistently as people."

However, the main merit of M. Kaplan is that thanks to his work "System and Process in International Politics"

he became one of the first scientists to draw attention to the importance, fruitfulness and necessity of a systematic approach in this area of ​​research.

Indeed, despite the fact that understanding the importance this approach in social sciences, it goes back to Antiquity, it only relatively recently became widespread in them, and in the theory of international relations it gained relevance due to an attempt to make it the basis for the study and forecasting of political interactions between states, which was first tested by M. Kaplan. He made a significant contribution to the consideration of international reality as a certain integrity, functioning according to its own, albeit not always clear and unchanging, laws, and not just as a certain set of interacting elements that can be studied in isolation. At the same time, one of the main ideas of M. Kaplan's concept is to postulate the fundamental role that its structure plays in understanding the patterns and determinants of the international system. This idea is shared by the absolute majority of researchers: on its basis J. Modelski and O. Young, M. Haas and S. Hoffmann, K. Waltz and R. Aron built their theories ...; the founders of the English school [see: 11], constructivism and neo-Marxism in the theory of international relations relied on it. In domestic science, the use of a systematic approach in this area of ​​research has yielded fruitful results in the works of A.D. Bogaturova, N.A. Kosolapova, M.A. Khrustalev and many others.

The indicated advantages of M. Kaplan's work are not canceled by the subsequently identified limits and risks associated with the use of system analysis [see, for example: 8; 27]. The risks are due to the fact that, firstly, not a single system that has reached a certain level of complexity can be fully cognized: as soon as the researcher goes beyond the relatively simple systems, the grounds for considering his conclusions to be correct are significantly diminished. Secondly, not every reality can be “squeezed” into the conceptual boundaries of the systems approach without the threat of distorting its inherent characteristics. Third, it may be tempting to substitute simplified holism for research analytics. Fourthly, systems analysis can obscure alternative approaches, because often a superficial comparison of different objects gives the impression that the common features in them make them similar, while researchers forget that the objects under study also have differences, which may turn out to be much more significant. Fifth, the systems approach is quite conservative, which is associated with a superficial analogy between mechanical and organic systems, on the one hand, and social systems, on the other. So, the issues of equilibrium, stability and survival of the system are the fruits of the transfer of models from one sphere to another on the basis of superficial analogies, without the necessary consideration of the characteristics of social (in this case international) systems. Finally, sixth, questions of a philosophical, even ethical nature arise related to the influence of systems analysis on political behavior. The risk is that the system theory, revealing the mechanisms of functioning, the factors of balance, harmony and disharmony of social systems, can lead to political action, the norms of which are determined by a certain model. This is the question of reducing the study of international relations to "socio-technical" procedures. However, the political practice of international relations cannot be reduced to a simple application of scientific evidence. The technical and organizational rationality of system models, as noted by J. Habermas, does not exhaust the rationality of political action [see. about this: 27]. And this despite the fact that political action, like human behavior in general, is far from always distinguished by rationality.

It should be noted that M. Kaplan himself saw the limits and pitfalls of the systemic approach. Thus, he emphasized that, firstly, “... methods of mathematical study of the complex problem of interactions in the system have not yet been developed. For example, a physical scientist can make accurate predictions for a two-member system, rough predictions for a three-member system, and only partial predictions for a large-member system. A scientist cannot predict the path of one gas molecule in an entire cistern filled with gas.

Second, the predictions made by the physicist apply only to an isolated system. The scientist does not make a prediction about the amount of gas in the tank, about the invariability of the temperature in the tank, or about the fact that it will constantly be at the site of the experiment. He predicts what will be the characteristic behavior of most of the gas molecules in the presence of constant conditions of temperature, pressure, etc. " ... In this regard, M. Kaplan believed that the one who develops the models does not consider them as applicable at all. They are applicable only within a certain social context, which must be previously clarified. In doing so, it is extremely important to determine whether this context actually exists.

M. Kaplan also warned: “Game theory has not solved the most important strategic problems, especially those that arise in the field of international politics. ... Game theory analysis is not an accurate tool for addressing these problems. This kind of analysis also cannot serve as a substitute for other political and sociological theories. " "However, if game theory is currently not a sufficient analytical tool, then it at least narrows the scope in which rational decision-making can take place, and also reveals the factors that influence strategic games." Ultimately M. Kaplan wrote: “The degree of confidence that we give to our research will never come close to that which a physicist has in relation to the study of mechanics. ... At the same time, without theoretical models, we are unable to operate even with the differences that are available to us, and study these issues with the same degree of depth. "

It is no coincidence that even such an opponent of the "scientific" approach as H. Bull, not only did not deny, but also actively used in his studies the concept of "international system", believing that its main attributes are, "firstly, the existence of many sovereign states; second, the level of interaction between them in the sense in which they form the system;

third, the degree of acceptance general rules and institutions in the sense in which they shape society ”. It is also no coincidence that the three most widespread approaches to the study of international relations - from the standpoint of the international system, international society and world society - do not exclude, but mutually presuppose each other. As K. Boulding emphasized, the study of international systems undertaken by M. Kaplan is extremely important, and not so much from the point of view of the results he achieved, but from the position of the methodological path that it opens in the analysis of international relations.

This is primarily due to the heuristic potential that the systemic approach possesses, facilitating the task of finding conditions for equilibrium and stability, mechanisms for regulating and transforming international systems. In this respect, the work of Morton Kaplan can still serve as a significant help in the analysis of international politics.

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26. Kaplan MA, Katzenbach N. De B. The Patterns of International Politics and of International Law // The American Political Science Review. 1959. Vol.

53. No. 3. P. 693-712.

27. Meszaros T. Quelques reflexions sur l'ide du systme en sciences politiques // Encyclopdie de L'Agora. URL: http: // agora.

qc.ca/cosmopolis.nsf/Articles/no2007_2_Quelques_reflexions_sur_lidee_de_ systeme_en_scien? OpenDocument (visite: 15.02.2012).

28. Modelski G. Evolutionary Paradigm for Global Politics // International Studies Quarterly. 1996. Vol. 40. No. 3. P. 321-342.

29. Monroe K.R. The Chicago School: Forgotten but Not Gone // Perspectives Forum on the Chicago School of Political Science. March 2004. Vol. 2.

No. 1. P. 95-98.

30. Nettl P. The Concept of System in Political Science // Political Studies.

1966. Vol. 14.No. 3. P. 305-338.

31. Onuf N. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

32. Rosecrance R. Action and Reaction in World Politics. Boston: Little Brown, 1963.

33. Waltz K. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub, 1979.

34. Wendt A. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

35. Young O. Systems of Political Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J .: Prentice-
"SCIENCE" MOSKVA -1968 SODE RJANIE BA Uspenskiy (Moscow). The relations of subsystems in the language and are connected ... "VARIANTS OF VIOLATIONS OF THE MENTAL R ..." THE PETERSBURG PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL anthropologism is the main feature of the St. Petersburg psychological school, founded by V. M. Bekhterev and B. G. Ananiev. According to modern anthropological ... " L.A. Melentieva Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Irkutsk, Russia [email protected], [email protected] Abstract B with ... "

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INSTITUTE

OPEN

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P. A. Tsygankov

INTERNATIONAL

relationship

Recommended by the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Higher Education as a textbook for students of higher educational institutions studying in the areas of "Political Science", "Sociology", specialties "Political Science", "Sociology", "International Relations".

Moscow "New School"

BBK 60.56 i 73 Ts 96 UD K 316: 327

Tsygankov P.A.

C 96 International relations: Textbook. - M .:

New school, 1996 .-- 320 p. ISBN 5-7301-0281-10

The main purpose of the manual is to summarize and systematize the most established positions and conclusions available in the world scientific and educational literature on international relations; help in the formation of a primary understanding of the current level of development of this discipline in our country and abroad.

The manual is addressed to undergraduate and graduate students in the specialties: "International Relations", "Political Science", "Sociology" - as well as all students of social sciences and interested in the problems of international relations.

BBK 60.56 i 73

Foreword ...........................................
	Chapter I. Theoretical origins and conceptual foundations
	international relations .................................
				1. International relations in history
				socio-political thought ....................................
				2. Modern theories of international relations
				3. French sociological school .......................
Notes ....................................
Chapter II. About & eject and subject of International relations ........
			1. The concept and criteria of international relations .............
			2. World politics ....................................
			3. The relationship between domestic and foreign policy ..................
			4. Subject of International Relations
					Notes ...................................	-....................
Chapter III. Method Problem in International Relations ....
					Significance of the problem of the method ...............................
					Situation Analysis Methods ...........................
					Explicative methods ...................................
					Predictive methods ..................................
					Analysis of the decision-making process .........................
					Notes ...............................	- .. ..........-
Chapter IV. Patterns of International Relations .........

1. On the nature of laws in the field of international relations ................................

2. The content of the laws of international relations ...........................................

3. Universal patterns of International

Chapter V. International system .......................................

1. Features and main directions of a systematic approach to the analysis of international relations ..........

2. Types and structures of international systems ...............

3. The laws of the functioning and transformation of international systems ............................................ .......

Chapter VI. The environment of the system of international relations .........

1. Features of the environment of international relations ........

2. Social environment. Features of the modern stage of world civilization ............................................. ............

3. Non-social environment. The role of geopolitics in science

O international relations ...........................................

Chapter VII. Participants in international relations ....

1. The essence and role of the state as a participant in international relations ......................................

2. Non-state participants in international relations .............................................. ....................

Notes ................................................. ...............

Chapter VIII. Aims and means of participants in international

relations ................................................. .............................

1. Goals and interests in international relations ...

2. Means and strategies of participants in international relations ............................................ .............................

3. Features of power as a means of international actors ............................................ ..................................

Notes ................................................. .....................

Chapter IX. The problem of legal regulation

international relations ................................................ ...

1. Historical forms and features of the regulatory role of international law .......................................... ..

2. Basic principles of international law ............

3. Interaction of law and morality in international relations ........................................... ............................

Notes ................................................. ......................

Chapter X. Ethical dimension of international

relations ................................................. ................................

1. The variety of interpretations of international morality .......

2. Basic imperatives of international morality ..........

3. On the effectiveness of moral standards in international relations ........................................... ...............................

Notes ................................................. .........................

Chapter XI. Conflicts and cooperation in international

relationship ................................................. ..............................

1. Basic approaches to the study of international conflicts ............................................ ...............................

2. Content and forms of international cooperation ............................................. ........................

Notes ................................................. .........................

Chapter XII. International order ..................................

1. The concept of international order ............................

2. Historical types of international order .........

3. Post-war international order ..................

4. Features of the current stage of the international order ............................................. .................................

Notes ................................................. .....................

Application (tests) .............................................. ...............

TSYGANKOV Pavel Afanasevich INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONSHIP

Tutorial

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FOREWORD

International relations have long occupied an essential place in the life of any state, society and individual. The origin of nations, the formation of interstate borders, the formation and change of political regimes, the formation of various social institutions, the enrichment of cultures, the development of art, science, technical progress and an efficient economy are closely related to trade, financial, cultural and other exchanges, interstate alliances, diplomatic contacts and other exchanges, interstate alliances, diplomatic contacts and military conflicts - or, in other words, with international relations. Their importance is growing even more today, when all countries are woven into a dense, ramified network of diverse interactions that affect the volumes and nature of production, types of goods created and prices for them, consumption standards, values ​​and ideals of people.

The end of the "cold war" and the collapse of the "world socialist system", the entry into the international arena of the former Soviet republics as independent states, the search for a new Russia for its place in the world, the definition of its foreign policy priorities, the reformulation of national interests - all these and many other circumstances of international life have a direct impact on the everyday existence of people and the fate of Russians, on the present and future of our country, its immediate environment and, in a sense, on the fate of humanity as a whole.

In the light of what has been said, it becomes clear that in our days the objective need for a theoretical understanding of international relations, in the analysis of the changes taking place here and their consequences, and, not least of all, in the

I. II. III. IV. V. *** VI. Vii. VIII. *** IX. X. XI. XII. ()

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, . ", . 28 , . , . (25). , 80% , . , . , . , (26). . , 1974 , . , . , . , - , . . (, .) 29 , . , 80- . , . (27). , .

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. , (.: 34, . 457459). , . , .-. (37) , : , . , . . , . . , 37 , . . , . , . . , (,) () (). . , . , (), (..). , - , . , . , . , . , (38). . , -, . , - . -, . , : 38 , . ,

, .. . -, : , . , . , -, . , . , . , . , . , ; (); , (), () () . , . , . (.: , . 8)? , 39 , . , . : 1) ; 2) , ; 3) : ; 4) : , ; 5) ; 6) ; 7) ; 8) .. (.: , . 1825). , . , (), . , (): 1) (,); 2) (,); 3)

; 4) ; 5) . ,. ,. -,:,. , 40:,. ,. ,. ,. ,. , (.,: 38),. -,. -, (39). , (). , (.: 39,. 535). ,. , .-. ... ,. .-. ,. ... ,. ... ,. ,. .-. .,. 1. Hoffmann S. Thorie et relations internationales. // Revue franaise de science politique. 1961, Vol. XI, pp. 2627.

2.. ... ... ... ,. 1.., 1987,. 22.3. ,. ., 1960,. 451. 4.. :. , 1993,. 89; ... ... ,. 2728; Huntzinger J. Introduction aux relations internationales. P., 1987, p. 30.5. : 5. . ., 1974,. Vii. 6..,. ... //. ... ... ... ... 2-, .4. ., 1955,. 430. 7. ... //. ... .,. 27. 8. Martin P.-M. Introduction aux relations internationales. Toulouse, 1982. 9. Bosc R. Sociologie de la paix. Paris, 1965. 10. Brallard Ph. Thories des relatons internationales. Paris, 1977. 11. Bull H. International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. // World Politics, 1966. Vol. XVIII. 12. Kaplan M. A new Great Debate: Traditionalisme versus Science in Intarnational Relations. // World Politics, 1966, Vol. XIX. 13. . ... ., 1976. 14. Korany. et coll. Analyze des relatio ...

Tsygankov P. Political Sociology of International Relations

Chapter I. Theoretical origins and conceptual foundations of the political sociology of international relations

Political sociology of international relations is an integral part of the science of international relations, which includes diplomatic history, international law, world economy, military strategy and many other disciplines. Of particular importance is the theory of international relations, which is understood as a set of multiple conceptual generalizations presented by polemicizing theoretical schools and constituting the subject field of a relatively autonomous discipline. This discipline, called in the West "International Relations", is being rethought in the light of the general sociological understanding of the world as a single society of the sphere of interaction between individuals and diverse social communities operating in the context of the global changes observed today affecting the fate of humanity and the existing world order. In the above sense, the theory of international relations, as emphasized by S. Hoffmann, is both very old and very young. Already in ancient times, political philosophy and history raised questions about the causes of conflicts and wars, about the means and ways of achieving peace between peoples, about the rules of their interaction, etc., and therefore it is old. But at the same time, it is young, because it involves a systematic study of the observed phenomena, designed to identify the main determinants, explain behavior, reveal the typical, repeated in the interaction of international authors. This study refers mainly to the post-war period. Only after 1945 did the theory of international relations really begin to free itself from the "strangulation" of history and from the "oppression" of legal science. In fact, in the same period, the first attempts to "sociologize" it appeared, which subsequently (in the late 50s and early 60s) led to the formation (though continuing to this day) of the sociology of international relations as a relatively autonomous discipline.

Based on the foregoing, comprehending the theoretical sources and conceptual foundations of the sociology of international relations presupposes an appeal to the views of the predecessors of modern international political science, consideration of the most influential theoretical schools and trends today, as well as an analysis of the current state of the sociology of international relations.

1. International relations in the history of socio-political thought

One of the first written sources containing a deep analysis of the relationship between sovereign political units, was written more than two thousand years ago by Thucydides (471-401 BC) "History of the Peloponnesian War in eight books." Many theses and conclusions of the ancient Greek historian have not lost their significance to this day, thereby confirming his words that the work he compiled is "not so much a subject of competition for temporary listeners, but a property forever." Asking the reasons for the long-term exhausting war between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, the historian draws attention to the fact that these were the most powerful and prosperous nations, each of which dominated over its allies. "... From the time of the Median wars to the last, they did not cease to reconcile, then fight with each other, or with the falling away allies, and they improved in military affairs, became more sophisticated in the midst of dangers and became more skillful" (ibid., P. 18). Since both powerful states turned into a kind of empire, the strengthening of one of them, as it were, doomed them to continue this path, pushing them to the desire to subjugate all their surroundings in order to maintain their prestige and influence. In turn, the other "empire", as well as smaller city-states, experiencing growing fear and anxiety about such a strengthening, take measures to strengthen their defenses, thereby being drawn into a conflict cycle that ultimately inevitably turns into war. That is why Thucydides from the very beginning separates the causes of the Peloponnesian war from the various reasons for it: "The most real reason, although in words the most hidden, is, in my opinion, that the Athenians, by their strengthening, inspired fear in the Lacedaemonians and thus led them to war." (see note 2-volume 1, page 24).

Thucydides speaks not only of the domination of power in relations between sovereign political units. In his work, you can find a mention of the interests of the state, as well as the priority of these interests over the interests of an individual (see note 2 vol. 1, p. 91; vol. II, p. 60). Thus, in a sense, he became the ancestor of one of the most influential trends in later concepts and in modern science of international relations. In the future, this direction, which received the name classic or traditional, was represented in the views of N. Machiavelli (1469-1527), T. Hobbes (1588-1679), E. de Wattel (1714-1767) and other thinkers, acquiring the most complete form in the work of the German general K. von Clausewitz (1780 -1831).

So, T. Hobbes proceeds from the fact that man is by nature an egoistic being. It contains an enduring desire for power. Since people are not naturally equal in their abilities, their rivalry, mutual distrust, desire to possess material goods, prestige or fame lead to a constant “war of all against everyone and everyone against everyone”, which is the natural state of human relationships. In order to avoid mutual extermination in this war, people come to the need to conclude a social contract, the result of which is the Leviathan state. This happens through a voluntary transfer by people to the state of their rights and freedoms in exchange for guarantees of public order, peace and security. However, if relations between individuals are thus introduced into the channel, albeit artificial and relative, but still civil, then relations between states continue to be in a natural state. Being independent, states are not bound by any restrictions. Each of them owns that which it is able to capture ”and as long as it is able to hold the captured. Thus, the only "regulator" of interstate relations is strength, and the participants in these relations themselves are in the position of gladiators, holding weapons at the ready and wary of watching each other's behavior.

A variation of this paradigm is the theory of political equilibrium, which was adhered to, for example, by the Dutch thinker B. Spinoza (1632-1677), the English philosopher D. Hume (1711-1776), as well as the above-mentioned Swiss lawyer E. de Wattel. Thus, de Vattel's view of the essence of interstate relations is not as gloomy as that of Hobbes. The world has changed, he believes, and at least “Europe is a political system, a whole in which everything is connected with the relations and different interests of the nations living in this part of the world. It is not, as it once was, a disorderly heap of separate particles, each of which considered itself little interested in the fate of others and rarely cared about what did not concern itself directly. " The constant attention of sovereigns to everything that happens in Europe, the constant presence of embassies, constant negotiations contribute to the formation of independent European states, along with national interests, of the interests of maintaining order and freedom in it. “It is this, de Vattel emphasizes, that gave rise to the famous idea of ​​political balance, the balance of power. This is understood as such an order of things in which no power is able to absolutely prevail over others and establish laws for them. "

At the same time, E. de Vattel, in full accordance with the classical tradition, believed that the interests of individuals are secondary in comparison with the interests of the nation (state). In turn, “if we are talking about saving the state, then you cannot be overly prudent” when there is reason to believe that the strengthening of a neighboring state threatens your security. “If it is so easy to believe in the threat of danger, then the neighbor is to blame, showing various signs of his ambitious intentions” (see note 4, p. 448). This means that a preemptive war against a dangerously rising neighbor is legal and just. But what if the forces of this neighbor are far superior to those of other states? In this case, de Vattel replies, “it is easier, more convenient and more correct to resort to ... the formation of coalitions that could oppose the most powerful state and prevent it from dictating its will. This is what the sovereigns of Europe are doing now. They join the weaker of the two main powers, which are natural rivals, designed to restrain each other, as appendages to the less loaded scale in order to keep it in balance with the other pan "(see note 4, p. 451).

In parallel with the traditional, another direction is developing, the emergence of which in Europe is associated with the philosophy of the Stoics, the development of Christianity, the views of the Spanish theologian Dominican. F. Vittoria (1480-1546), the Dutch jurist G. Grotius (1583-1645), the representative of the German classical philosophy I. Kant (1724-1804) and other thinkers. It is based on the idea of ​​moral and political unity of the human race, as well as inalienable, natural human rights. In different eras, in the views of different thinkers, this idea took on different forms.

Thus, in the interpretation of F. Vittoria (see 2, p. 30), the priority in relations between a person and the state belongs to the person, while the state is nothing more than a simple necessity that facilitates the problem of human survival. On the other hand, the unity of the human race ultimately makes any division of it into separate states secondary and artificial. Therefore, a normal, natural human right is his right to free movement. In other words, Vittoria places natural human rights above the prerogatives of the state, anticipating and even ahead of the modern liberal-democratic interpretation of this issue.

The considered direction has always been accompanied by the conviction that it is possible to achieve eternal peace between people either through legal and moral regulation of international relations, or in other ways associated with the self-realization of historical necessity. According to Kant, for example, just as relations between individuals based on contradictions and self-interest will ultimately inevitably lead to the establishment of a legal society, relations between states should end in the future with a state of eternal, harmoniously regulated peace (see note 5, Ch. VII). Since the representatives of this trend appeal not so much to the existing as to the ought, and, in addition, rely on the corresponding philosophical ideas, insofar as the name of the idealistic one has been assigned to it.

The emergence of Marxism in the middle of the 19th century heralded the emergence of another paradigm in the views of international relations, which cannot be reduced to either the traditional or the idealistic direction. According to Karl Marx, world history begins with capitalism, for the basis of the capitalist mode of production is large-scale industry, which creates a single world market, the development of communications and transport. The bourgeoisie, through the exploitation of the world market, transforms the production and consumption of all countries into a cosmopolitan one and becomes the ruling class not only in individual capitalist states, but also on a global scale. In turn, "to the same degree as the bourgeoisie, that is, capital, develops, so does the proletariat." Thus, international relations in economic terms become relations of exploitation. On the political plane, they are relations of domination and subordination and, as a consequence, relations of class struggle and revolutions. Thus, national sovereignty and state interests are secondary, for objective laws contribute to the formation of a world society in which the capitalist economy dominates and the class struggle and the world-historical mission of the proletariat are the driving force. "National isolation and the opposition of peoples, wrote K. Marx and F. Engels, are disappearing more and more with the development of the bourgeoisie, with freedom of trade, the world market, with the uniformity of industrial production and the corresponding living conditions" (see note 6, p. 444).

In turn, V.I. Lenin emphasized that capitalism, having entered the state-monopoly stage of development, was transformed into imperialism. In his work "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism" 7 he writes that with the end of the era of the political division of the world between imperialist states, the problem of its economic division between the monopolies comes to the fore. Monopolies are faced with an ever-increasing problem of markets and the need to export capital to less developed countries with more high rate arrived. Inasmuch as they collide with each other in fierce competition, this necessity becomes the source of world political crises, wars and revolutions.

The considered main theoretical paradigms in the science of international relations, classical, idealistic and Marxist as a whole, remain relevant today. At the same time, it should be noted that the constitution of this science into a relatively independent area of ​​knowledge entailed a significant increase in the variety of theoretical approaches and methods of study, research schools and conceptual directions. Let's consider them in more detail.

2. Modern theories of international relations

The above diversity has greatly complicated and the problem of classification of modern theories of international relations, which in itself becomes a problem of scientific research.

There are many classifications of modern trends in the science of international relations, which is explained by differences in the criteria used by certain authors.

So, some of them proceed from geographical criteria, highlighting the Anglo-Saxon concepts, the Soviet and Chinese understanding of international relations, as well as the approach to their study of authors representing the "third world" 8.

Others build their typology on the basis of the degree of generality of the theories under consideration, distinguishing, for example, global explicative theories (such as political realism and philosophy of history) and particular hypotheses and methods (to which the behavioral school is attributed) 9. Within the framework of such a typology, the Swiss author G. Briar refers to the general theories of political realism, historical sociology and the Marxist-Leninist concept of international relations. As for private theories, the environment of them is called the theory of international authors (B. Korani); theory of interactions within international systems (O. R. Young; S. Amin; K. Kaiser); the theory of strategy, conflict and peace studies (A. Beaufre, D. Singer, I. Galtung); integration theory (A. Etzioni; K. Deutsch); theories of international organization (J. Siotis; D. Holly) 10.

Still others believe that the main dividing line is the method used by certain researchers and, from this point of view, focus on polemics between representatives of the traditional and "scientific" approaches to the analysis of international relations 11,12.

The fourth point out the central problems characteristic of a particular theory, accentuating the main and turning points in the development of science 13.

Finally, the fifth are based on complex criteria. Thus, the Canadian scientist B. Korani builds a typology of theories of international relations based on the methods they use ("classical" and "modernist") and the conceptual vision of the world ("liberal-pluralistic" and "materialist-structuralist"). As a result, he singles out such directions as political realism (G. Morgenthau, R. Aron, H. Bul), behaviorism (D. Singer; M. Kaplan), classical Marxism (K. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin) and neo-Marxism (or the school of "dependence": I. Wollerstein, S. Amin, A. Frank, F. Cardoso) 14. Likewise, D. Coliard drew attention to the classical theory of the "state of nature" and its modern version (that is, political realism); the theory of the "international community" (or political idealism); the Marxist ideological trend and its many interpretations; doctrinal Anglo-Saxon current, as well as the French School of International Relations 15. M. Merle believes that the main trends in modern science of international relations are represented by traditionalists by the heirs of the classical school (G. Morgenthau, S. Hoffmann, G. Kissinger); Anglo-Saxon sociological concepts of behaviorism and functionalism (R. Cox, D. Singer, M. Kaplan; D. Easton); Marxist and neo-Marxist (P. Baran, P. Sweezy, S. Amin) currents 16.

Examples of different classifications of modern theory of international relations could be continued. It is important, however, to note at least three significant points. First, any of these classifications is conditional and unable to exhaust the diversity of theoretical views and methodological approaches to the analysis of international relations. Secondly, this diversity does not mean that modern theories have managed to overcome their "blood relationship" with the three main paradigms discussed above. Finally, thirdly, the question of the still encountered and today the opposite opinion, there is every reason to talk about the outlined synthesis, mutual enrichment, mutual "compromise" between previously irreconcilable directions.

Based on the foregoing, we will confine ourselves to a brief consideration of such directions (and their varieties) as political idealism, political realism, modernism, transnationalism and neo-marxism.

The legacy of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Wattel and Clausewitz, on the one hand, Vittoria, Grotius, Kant on the other, was directly reflected in a major scientific discussion that arose in the United States between the two world wars, a discussion between idealists and realists.

Idealism in the modern science of international relations also has closer ideological and theoretical origins, which are utopian socialism, liberalism and pacifism of the 19th century. Its basic premise is the conviction of the necessity and possibility of putting an end to world wars and armed conflicts between states by legal regulation and democratization of international relations, spreading the norms of morality and justice to them. According to this direction, the world community of democratic states, with the support and pressure from public opinion, is quite capable of settling conflicts between its members peacefully, by methods of legal regulation, increasing the number and role of international organizations that contribute to the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation and exchange. One of its priority themes is the creation of a collective security system based on voluntary disarmament and mutual renunciation of war as an instrument of international politics. In political practice, idealism was embodied in the program for the creation of the League of Nations 17, developed after the First World War by the American President W. .), according to which the United States waives diplomatic recognition of any change if it is achieved by force. In the post-war years, the idealistic tradition found some embodiment in the activities of such American politicians as Secretary of State J.F. Dulles and Secretary of State Z. Brzezinski (representing, however, not only the political, but also the academic elite of his country), Presidents D. Carter (1976-1980) and G. Bush (1988-1992). In the scientific literature, it was presented, in particular, by the book of American authors R. Clarke and L.B. Sona "Achievement of Peace through World Law". The book proposes a project of phased disarmament and the creation of a collective security system for the whole world for the period 1960-1980. The main instrument for overcoming wars and achieving eternal peace between peoples should be a world government led by the UN and acting on the basis of a detailed world constitution. Similar ideas are expressed in a number of works by European authors 19. The idea of ​​a world government was expressed in the papal encyclicals: John XXIII "Pacem in terris" from 04.16.63, Paul VI "Populorum progressio" from 03.26.67, as well as John Paul II from 2. 12.80, which even today advocates the creation of "political power endowed with universal competence."

Thus, the idealistic paradigm that accompanied the history of international relations for centuries retains a certain influence on the minds today. Moreover, it can be said that in recent years its influence on some aspects of theoretical analysis and forecasting in the field of international relations has even increased, becoming the basis for practical steps taken by the world community to democratize and humanize these relations, as well as attempts to form a new, consciously regulated world an order that meets the common interests of all mankind.

At the same time, it should be noted that idealism for a long time (and in some respects to this day) was considered to have lost all influence and, in any case, hopelessly lagging behind the requirements of modernity. Indeed, the normative approach underlying it was deeply undermined by the growing tension in Europe in the 1930s, the aggressive policy of fascism and the collapse of the League of Nations, and the unleashing of the world conflict of 1939-1945. and the Cold War in subsequent years. The result was the revival on American soil of the European classical tradition with its inherent advancement in the analysis of international relations of such concepts as "strength" and "balance of power", "national interest" and "conflict".

Political realism not only subjected idealism to crushing criticism, pointing, in particular, to the fact that the idealistic illusions of statesmen of that time contributed greatly to the outbreak of World War II, but also proposed a fairly coherent theory. Its most famous representatives R. Niebuhr, F. Schumann, J. Kennan, J. Schwarzenberger, K. Thompson, G. Kissinger, E. Carr, A. Wolfers and others have long defined the ways of the science of international relations. G. Morgenthau and R. Aron became the undisputed leaders of this trend.

The work of G. Morgenthau “Politics among the nation. Struggle for influence and peace ”, the first edition of which was published in 1948, has become a kind of“ bible ”for many generations of political science students in the United States and other Western countries. From the point of view of G. Morgenthau "international relations are an arena of acute confrontation between states. At the heart of all the international activities of the latter is the desire to increase their own power, or strength (power) and reduce the power of others. In this case, the term "power" is understood in the very broad sense: as the military and economic power of the state, a guarantee of its greatest security and prosperity, glory and prestige, opportunities for the dissemination of its ideological attitudes and spiritual values. The two main ways in which the state secures power for itself, and at the same time, two complementary aspects of its foreign policy are military strategy and diplomacy. The first of them is interpreted in the spirit of Clausewitz: as a continuation of politics by violent means. Diplomacy, on the other hand, is a peaceful struggle for power. In the modern era, says G. Morgenthau, states express their need for power in terms of "national interest." The result of the striving of each of the states to maximize the satisfaction of their national interests is the establishment in the world arena of a certain equilibrium (balance) of power (force), which is the only realistic way to ensure and maintain peace. Actually, the state of the world is the state of the balance of power between states.

According to Mergentau, there are two factors that are capable of keeping the aspirations of states for power within some framework - international law and morality. However, to trust them too much in an effort to ensure peace between states would mean falling into the unforgivable illusions of the idealistic school. The problem of war and peace has no chance of being resolved through collective security mechanisms or through the UN. The projects of harmonizing national interests by creating a world community or a world state are also utopian. The only way to hopefully avoid a world nuclear war is to renew diplomacy.

In his concept, G. Morgenthau proceeds from the six principles of political realism, which he substantiates already at the very beginning of his book 20. In summary, they look like this.

1. Politics, like society as a whole, is governed by objective laws, the roots of which are in the eternal and unchanging human nature. Therefore, there is the possibility of creating a rational theory that is able to reflect these laws, although only relatively and partially. Such a theory allows one to separate objective truth in international politics from subjective judgments about it.

2. The main indicator of political realism is "the concept of interest expressed in terms of power." It provides a link between the mind seeking to understand international politics and the facts to be learned. It allows us to understand politics as an independent sphere of human life, not reducible to ethical, aesthetic, economic or religious spheres. Thus, this concept avoids two mistakes. First, judgments about the interest of a politician based on motives, not on the basis of his behavior, and, second, deduction of the interest of a politician from his ideological or moral preferences, and not "official duties."

Political realism includes not only a theoretical but also a normative element: it insists on the need for rational politics. Rational policy is the right policy because it minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. At the same time, the rationality of politics also depends on its moral and practical goals.

3. The content of the concept "interest expressed in terms of power" is not unchanged. It depends on the political and cultural context in which the formation of the state's international policy takes place. This also applies to the concepts of "power" and "political equilibrium", as well as to such an initial concept designating the main actor in international politics as "state-nation".

Political realism differs from all other theoretical schools primarily in the fundamental question of how to change the modern world. He is convinced that such a change can be carried out only through the skillful use of objective laws that operated in the past and will operate in the future, and not by subordinating political reality to some abstract ideal that refuses to recognize such laws.

4. Political realism recognizes the moral significance of political action. But at the same time he is aware of the existence of an inevitable contradiction between the moral imperative and the requirements of successful political action. The main moral requirements cannot be applied to the activities of the state as abstract and universal norms. Oki must be considered in the specific circumstances of place and time. The state cannot say: "Let the world perish, but justice must prevail!" It cannot afford to commit suicide. Therefore, the highest moral virtue in international politics is moderation and caution.

5. Political realism refuses to equate the moral aspirations of any nation with universal moral norms. It is one thing to know that nations obey the moral law in their policies, and quite another to claim knowledge of what is good and what is bad in international relations.

6. The theory of political realism is based on a pluralistic concept of human nature. A real person is both an "economic person" and a "moral person" and a "religious person" and so on. Only a political person ”is like an animal, because he has no“ moral brakes ”. Only a "moral person" is a fool because he is devoid of caution. Only a “religious person” can only be a saint, since he has no earthly desires.

Recognizing this, political realism defends the relative autonomy of these aspects and insists that the knowledge of each of them requires abstraction from the others and occurs in its own terms.

As we will see from what follows, not all of the above principles, formulated by the founder of the theory of political realism, G. Morgenthau, are unconditionally shared by other adherents and, moreover, opponents of this trend. At the same time, his conceptual harmony, the desire to rely on the objective laws of social development, an impartial and rigorous analysis of international reality, which differs from abstract ideals and fruitless and dangerous illusions based on them, all this contributed to the expansion of the influence and authority of political realism in the academic environment. and in the circles of statesmen of various countries.

However, political realism did not become the undividedly dominant paradigm in the science of international relations. From the very beginning, its serious shortcomings prevented its transformation into the central link, cementing the beginning of a unified theory.

The fact is that, proceeding from the understanding of international relations as a "natural state" of power confrontation for the possession of power, political realism essentially reduces these relations to interstate relations, which significantly impoverishes their understanding. Moreover, the domestic and foreign policies of the state, as interpreted by political realists, look like they are not connected with each other, and the states themselves look like a kind of interchangeable mechanical bodies with an identical response to external influences. The only difference is that some states are strong and others are weak. No wonder one of the influential adherents of political realism A. Wolfers built a picture of international relations, comparing the interaction of states on the world arena with a collision of balls on billiard table 21. Absolutizing the role of power and underestimating the importance of other factors, for example, such as spiritual values, sociocultural realities, etc. significantly impoverishes the analysis of international relations, reduces the degree of its reliability. This is all the more true since the content of such key concepts for the theory of political realism as “power” and “national interest” remains rather vague in it, giving rise to discussions and ambiguous interpretation. Finally, in its striving to rely on the eternal and unchanging objective laws of international interaction, political realism has essentially become a hostage of its own approach. He lost sight of the very important trends and changes that have already taken place, which increasingly distinguish the nature of modern international relations from those that prevailed in the international arena until the beginning of the 20th century. At the same time, one more circumstance was overlooked: these changes require the use, along with traditional, and new methods and means of scientific analysis of international relations. All this caused criticism of political realism from adherents of other approaches, and, above all, from representatives of the so-called modernist direction and diverse theories of interdependence and integration. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this controversy, which actually accompanied the theory of political realism from its first steps, contributed to the growing awareness of the need to complement the political analysis of international realities with a sociological one.

Representatives of modernism ", or " scientific " trends in the analysis of international relations, most often without touching upon the initial postulates of political realism, sharply criticized its adherence to traditional methods based mainly on intuition and theoretical interpretation. The controversy between the "modernists" and the "traditionalists" reaches a particular intensity since the 1960s, having received the name of the "new big debate" in the scientific literature (see, for example, notes 12 and 22). The source of this dispute was the persistent desire of a number of researchers of the new generation (K. Wright, M. Kaplan, K. Deutsch, D. Singer, K. Holsty, E. Haas and many others) to overcome the shortcomings of the classical approach and give the study of international relations a truly scientific status. ... Hence the increased attention to the use of mathematical tools, formalization, modeling, data collection and processing, empirical verification of results, as well as other research procedures borrowed from exact disciplines and opposed to traditional methods based on the intuition of the researcher, judgments by analogy, etc. This approach, which emerged in the United States, touched the study of not only international relations, but also other spheres of social reality, being an expression of the penetration into social sciences of a broader trend of positivism that arose on European soil back in the 19th century.

Indeed, even Saint-Simon and O. Comte attempted to apply rigorous scientific methods to the study of social phenomena. The presence of a solid empirical tradition, methods already tested in disciplines such as sociology or psychology, an appropriate technical base that gives researchers new means of analysis, prompted American scientists, starting with K. Wright, to strive to use all this baggage in the study of international relations. Such a desire was accompanied by the rejection of a priori judgments about the influence of certain factors on the nature of international relations, the denial of both any "metaphysical prejudices" and conclusions based, like Marxism, on deterministic hypotheses. However, as M. Merl emphasizes (see note 16, pp. 91-92), such an approach does not mean that one can do without a global explanatory hypothesis. The study of natural phenomena has developed two opposing models, between which social scientists also hesitate. On the one hand, this is Charles Darwin's doctrine of the merciless struggle of species and the law of natural selection and its Marxist interpretation, on the other hand, the organic philosophy of G. Spencer, which is based on the concept of constancy and stability of biological and social phenomena. Positivism in the United States followed the second path of assimilating society to a living organism, whose life is based on the differentiation and coordination of its various functions. From this point of view, the study of international relations, like any other type of social relations, should begin with an analysis of the functions performed by their participants, then proceed to the study of interactions between their carriers and, finally, to the problems associated with the adaptation of the social organism to its environment. In the legacy of organicism, M. Merle believes, two trends can be distinguished. One of them focuses on learning the behavior of the characters, the other on articulation different types such behavior. Accordingly, the first gave rise to behaviorism, and the second to functionalism and systematic approach in the science of international relations (see note 16, p. 93).

Being a reaction to the shortcomings of traditional methods of studying international relations used in the theory of political realism, modernism did not become any homogeneous trend, either theoretically or methodologically. What he has in common is mainly a commitment to an interdisciplinary approach, a desire to apply rigorous scientific methods and procedures, and an increase in the number of verifiable empirical data. Its shortcomings lie in the actual denial of the specifics of international relations, the fragmentation of specific research facilities causing the actual absence holistic picture international relations, in the inability to avoid subjectivity. Nevertheless, many studies of the adherents of the modernist direction turned out to be very fruitful, enriching science not only with new methods, but also with very significant conclusions drawn on their basis. It is also important to note the fact that they opened up the prospect of a microsociological paradigm in the study of international relations.

If the controversy between the adherents of modernism and political realism concerned mainly the methods of studying international relations, then the representatives transnationalism(R.O. Keohan, J. Nye), integration theories(D. Mitrani) and interdependence(E. Haas, D. Moores) criticized the very conceptual foundations of the classical school. The role of the state as a participant in international relations, the importance of national interest and power for understanding the essence of what is happening on the world stage, turned out to be at the center of the new "big dispute" that erupted in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Supporters of various theoretical currents, which can be conditionally called "transnationalists", put forward the general idea that political realism and its inherent statist paradigm do not correspond to the nature and main trends of international relations and therefore should be discarded. International relations go far beyond the framework of interstate interactions based on national interests and power confrontation. The state as an international author is deprived of its monopoly. In addition to states, individuals, enterprises, organizations, and other non-state associations take part in international relations. The variety of participants, types (cultural and scientific cooperation, economic exchanges, etc.) and "channels" (partnerships between universities, religious organizations, communities and associations, etc.) interactions between them push the state out of the center of international communication, contribute to the transformation of such communication from "international" (that is, interstate, if we recall the etymological meaning of this term) into "transnational" (that is, spruce carried out "in addition to and without the participation of states). “The rejection of the prevailing intergovernmental approach and the desire to go beyond the framework of interstate interaction led us to think in terms of transnational relations,” American scholars J. Nye and R.O. Keohan (cited in: 3, p. 91-92).

This approach was significantly influenced by the ideas put forward in 1969 by J. Rosenau about the relationship between the internal life of society and international relations, about the role of social, economic and cultural factors in explaining the international behavior of governments, about “external” sources that may have purely “ internal ”, at first glance, events, etc. 23.

Revolutionary changes in the technology of communications and transport, the transformation of the situation on world markets, the growth in the number and importance of transnational corporations have stimulated the emergence of new trends in the world arena. The predominant among them are: the outstripping growth of world trade in comparison with world production, the penetration of the processes of modernization, urbanization and the development of means of communication in developing countries, the strengthening of the international role of small states and private entities, and finally, the reduction in the ability of great powers to control the state of the environment. The generalizing consequence and expression of all these processes is the growing interdependence of the world and the relative decrease in the role of force in international relations. Supporters of transnationalism are often inclined to view the sphere of transnational relations as a kind of international society, the analysis of which is subject to the same methods that allow us to understand and explain the processes taking place in any social organism. Thus, in essence, we are talking about a macrosociological paradigm in the approach to the study of international relations.

Transnationalism contributed to the awareness of a number of new phenomena in international relations, therefore, many of the provisions of this trend continue to be developed by its supporters in the 90s. (see, for example: 25). At the same time, he was imprinted by an undoubted ideological kinship with classical idealism, with its inherent tendencies to overestimate the real significance of the observed trends in changing the nature of international relations.

Some similarity of the provisions put forward by transnationalism with a number of provisions defended by the neo-Marxist trend in the science of international relations is noticeable.

Representatives neo-Marxism(P. Baran, P. Sweezy, S. Amin, A. Immanuel, I. Wollerstein and others), the current, which is as heterogeneous as transnationalism, is also united by the idea of ​​the integrity of the world community and a certain utopianism in determining its future. At the same time, the starting point and the basis for their conceptual construction is the idea of ​​the asymmetry of the interdependence of the modern world and, moreover, of the real dependence of economically underdeveloped countries on industrial states, of the exploitation and robbery of the former by the latter. Based on some theses of classical Marxism, neo-Marxists represent the space of international relations in the form of a global empire, the periphery of which remains under the yoke of the center even after the colonial countries had previously gained their political independence. This manifests itself in unequal economic exchanges and uneven development 26.

For example, the "center", within which about 80% of all world economic transactions are carried out, depends for its development on the raw materials and resources of the "periphery". In turn, the peripheral countries are consumers of industrial and other products produced outside of them. Thus, they become dependent on the center, becoming victims of unequal economic exchange, fluctuations in world prices for raw materials and economic assistance from developed countries. Therefore, in the final analysis, “economic growth based on integration into the world market is the development of underdevelopment” 27.

In the 70s, this approach to the consideration of international relations became the basis for the third world countries of the idea of ​​the need to establish a new world economic order. Under pressure from these countries, which constitute the majority of the member states of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly in April 1974 adopted a corresponding declaration and program of action, and in December of the same year a Charter on the economic rights and obligations of states.

Thus, each of the considered theoretical currents has its own strengths and weaknesses, each reflects certain aspects of reality and finds one or another manifestation in the practice of international relations. The controversy between them contributed to their mutual enrichment, and, consequently, the enrichment of the science of international relations in general. At the same time, it cannot be denied that this controversy did not convince the scientific community of the superiority of any one of the trends over the others, nor did it lead to their synthesis. Both of these conclusions can be illustrated by the example of the concept of neorealism.

This term itself reflects the desire of a number of American scientists (R.O. Keohan, K. Holsty, K. Waltz, R. Gilpin, etc.) to preserve the advantages of the classical tradition and at the same time to enrich it, taking into account new international realities and the achievements of other theoretical trends ... It is significant that one of the longest-standing supporters of transnationalism, Koohein, in the 80s. comes to the conclusion that the central concept of political realism is "strength", "national interest", rational behavior and others, remain an important means and condition for a fruitful analysis of international relations 28. On the other hand, K. Waltz speaks of the need to enrich the realistic approach at the expense of the scientific rigor of the data and the empirical verifiability of conclusions, the need for which the supporters of the traditional view, as a rule, rejected. Insisting that any theory of international relations should be based not on particulars, but on the integrity of the world, to make the existence of the global system, and not the states that are its elements, his starting point, Waltz takes a certain step towards rapprochement with transnationalists.

And yet, as B. Korani emphasizes, this revival of realism is much less explained by its own advantages than by the heterogeneity and weakness of any other theory. And the desire to preserve the maximum continuity with the classical school means that the lot of neorealism remains the majority of its inherent shortcomings (see note 14, pp. 300-302). An even harsher sentence is passed by the French authors M.-K. Smutz and B Badi, according to which the theories of international relations, remaining in the foam of the West-centric approach, were unable to reflect the radical changes taking place in the world system, as well as “to predict neither accelerated decolonization in post-war period, neither the outbreak of religious fundamentalism, nor the end of the Cold War, nor the collapse of the Soviet empire. In short, nothing that relates to a sinful social reality ”30.

Dissatisfaction with the state and possibilities of the science of international relations has become one of the main incentives for the creation and improvement of the relatively autonomous discipline of the sociology of international relations. The most consistent efforts in this direction have been made by French scholars.

3. French sociological school

Most of the works published in the world devoted to the study of international relations still bear the undoubted stamp of the predominance of American traditions today. At the same time, since the beginning of the 1980s, the influence of European theoretical thought and, in particular, the French school has become more and more tangible in this area. One of the famous scientists, professor at the Sorbonne M. Merle in 1983 noted that in France, despite the relative youth of the discipline studying international relations, three major directions have formed. One of them is guided by the "empirical-descriptive approach" and is represented by the works of such authors as K.A. Colliar, S. Zorgbib, S. Dreyfus, F. Moro-Defargue and others. The second is inspired by the Marxist theses on which P.F. Gonidek, C. Chaumont and their followers at the School of Nancy and Reims. A distinctive feature of the third direction is the sociological approach, which was most vividly embodied in the works of R. Aron31.

In the context of this work, one of the most significant features of the modern French school in the study of international relations seems to be especially interesting. The fact is that each of the theoretical trends discussed above, idealism and political realism, modernism and transnationalism, Marxism and neo-Marxism, exist in France as well. At the same time, they are refracted in the works of the historical and sociological direction that brought the greatest fame to the French school, which left an imprint on the entire science of international relations in this country. The influence of the historical-sociological approach is felt in the works of historians and lawyers, philosophers and political scientists, economists and geographers dealing with the problems of international relations. As Russian experts note, the formation of the basic methodological principles characteristic of the French theoretical school of international relations was influenced by the teachings of the philosophical, sociological and historical thought of France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and above all the positivism of Comte. It is in them that one should look for such features of French theories of international relations as attention to the structure of social life, a certain historicism, the predominance of the comparative historical method, and skepticism about mathematical methods of research 32.

At the same time, in the works of specific authors, these features are modified depending on the two main currents of sociological thought that developed already in the 20th century. One of them is based on the theoretical legacy of E. Durkheim, the second is based on the methodological principles formulated by M. Weber. Each of these approaches is formulated with the utmost clarity by such major representatives of the two lines in French sociology of international relations as, for example, R. Aron and G. Butoul.

"The sociology of Durkheim, writes R. Aron in his memoirs, did not touch in me either the metaphysics that I was striving to become, or the reader of Proust, who wants to understand the tragedy and comedy of people living in society." "Neo-Durktemism", he argued, is something like Marxism, on the contrary: if the latter describes class society in terms of the omnipotence of the dominant ideology and belittles the role of moral authority, the former expects to give morality its lost superiority over minds. However, denying the presence of a dominant ideology in society is the same utopia as the ideologization of society. Different classes cannot share the same values, just as totalitarian and liberal societies cannot have the same theory (see note ЗЗ, pp. 69-70). Weber, on the other hand, attracted Aron by the fact that, while objectifying social reality, he did not “materialize” it, did not ignore the rationality that people attach to their practical activities and their institutions. Aron points to three reasons for his adherence to the Weberian approach: M. Weber's assertion about the immanence of the meaning of social reality, closeness to politics and concern for epistemology, characteristic of social sciences (see note. ЗЗ, p. 71). The oscillation, central to Weber's thought, between a multitude of plausible interpretations and the only correct explanation of a particular social phenomenon became the basis for the Aronian view of reality, permeated with skepticism and criticism of normativeism in understanding social, including international relations.

It is therefore quite logical that R. Aron considers international relations in the spirit of political realism as a natural or pre-civil state. In the era of industrial civilization and nuclear weapons, he emphasizes, wars of conquest become both unprofitable and too risky. But this does not mean a radical change in the main feature of international relations, which consists in the legality and legitimacy of the use of force by their participants. Therefore, Aron stresses, peace is impossible, but war is also incredible. Hence follows the specificity of the sociology of international relations: its main problems are determined not by the minimum of social consensus, which is characteristic of intrasocial relations, but by the fact that they "unfold in the shadow of war", because it is the conflict, not the absence, that is normal for international relations. Therefore, the main thing that needs to be explained is not the state of peace, but the state of war.

R. Aron names four groups of basic problems of the sociology of international relations, applicable to the conditions of traditional (pre-industrial) civilization. First, it is "clarifying the relationship between the weapons used and the organization of armies, between the organization of the army and the structure of society." Second, "the study of which groups in a given society benefit from conquest." Third, the study "in each era, in each specific diplomatic system, that set of unwritten rules, more or less observed values ​​that characterize wars and the behavior of communities themselves in relation to each other." Finally, fourthly, an analysis of the “unconscious functions that armed conflicts have performed in history” 34.

Of course, most of the current problems of international relations, Aron emphasizes, cannot be the subject of flawless sociological research in terms of expectations, roles and values. However, since the essence of international relations has not undergone fundamental changes in the modern period, insofar as the above problems retain their significance today. To them can be added new ones arising from the conditions of international interaction characteristic of the second half of the 20th century. But the main thing is that as long as the essence of international relations remains the same, as long as it is determined by the pluralism of sovereignties, the central problem will remain the study of the decision-making process. Hence, Aron draws a pessimistic conclusion, according to which the nature and state of international relations depend mainly on those who govern states from "rulers" "who can only be advised and hope that they will not be crazy." And this means that "sociology, applied to international relations, reveals, so to speak, its boundaries" (see note 34, p. 158).

At the same time, Aron does not abandon the desire to determine the place of sociology in the study of international relations. In his fundamental work "Peace and War between Nations", he identifies four aspects of such a study, which he describes in the relevant sections of this book: "Theory", "Sociology", "History" and "Praxeologia" 35 "

The first section defines the basic rules and conceptual tools of analysis. Resorting to his favorite comparison of international relations with sports, R. Aron shows that there are two levels theory... The first is designed to answer the questions about “what techniques players have the right to use and what not; how they are distributed on the different lines of the playing court; what they are doing to increase the effectiveness of their actions and to destroy the enemy's efforts. "

Within the framework of the rules that answer such questions, numerous situations can arise: both random and pre-planned. Therefore, for each match, the coach develops an appropriate plan that clarifies the task of each player and his actions in certain typical situations that may develop on the court. At this second level of theory, it defines recommendations that describe the rules for the effective behavior of various participants (for example, goalkeeper, defender, etc.) in certain circumstances of the game. Strategy and diplomacy are singled out and analyzed as typical types of behavior of participants in international relations, a set of means and goals characteristic of any international situation, as well as typical systems of international relations, are considered.

On this basis is built sociology international relations, the subject of which is primarily the behavior of international authors. Sociology is called upon to answer the question of why a given state behaves in the international arena in this way, and not otherwise. Its main task is to study determinant and patterns, material and physical, as well as social and moral variables determining the policy of states and the course of international events. It also analyzes such issues as the nature of the influence of the political regime and / or ideology on international relations. Finding them out allows a sociologist to derive not only certain rules of behavior for international authors, but also to identify social types of international conflicts, as well as to formulate the laws of development of some typical international situations. Continuing the comparison with sports, we can say that at this stage the researcher no longer acts as an organizer or coach. Now he is solving questions of a different kind. How do the matches unfold not on the chalkboard, but on the playground? What are the specific features of the techniques used by players from different countries? Is there Latin, English, American football? What is the share of technical virtuosity in the success of the team, and what is the moral qualities of the team?

It is impossible to answer these questions, Aron continues, without addressing historical research: it is necessary to monitor the course of specific matches, changes in their "pattern", a variety of techniques and temperaments. The sociologist must constantly turn to both theory and history. If he does not understand the logic of the game, then it will be in vain to follow the actions of the players, because he will not be able to understand its tactical meaning. In the section on history, Aron describes the characteristics of the world system and its subsystems, analyzes various models of intimidation strategy in the nuclear age, traces the evolution of diplomacy between the two poles of the bipolar world and within each of them.

Finally, in the fourth part, devoted to praxeology, another symbolic character, the arbiter, appears. How should the provisions written in the rules of the game be interpreted? Was there a violation of the rules in certain conditions? Moreover, if the referee “judges” the players, then the players and spectators, in turn, silently or noisily, inevitably “judge” the referee himself, the players of one team “judge” both their partners and rivals, and so on. All of these judgments fluctuate between an assessment of efficiency (he played well), an assessment of punishment (he acted according to the rules) and an assessment of sports morale (this team behaved in accordance with the spirit of the game). Even in sports, not everything that is not prohibited is morally justified. Moreover, this applies to international relations. Their analysis also cannot be limited only to observation and description; it requires judgment and evaluations. Which strategy can be considered moral and which is reasonable or rational? What are the strengths and weaknesses of seeking peace through the rule of law? What are the advantages and disadvantages of trying to achieve it by establishing an empire?

As already noted, Aron's book "Peace and War between Nations" has played and continues to play a significant role in the formation and development of the French scientific school and, in particular, the sociology of international relations. Of course, the followers of his views (J.-P. Derrienik, R. Bosc, J. Unziger and others) take into account that many of the positions expressed by Aron belong to their time. However, he himself admits in his memoirs that “he did not half achieve his goal”, and to a large extent this self-criticism concerns precisely the sociological section and, in particular, the concrete application of laws and determinants to the analysis of specific problems (see note 34, p. .457-459). However, his very understanding of the sociology of international relations, and the main justification for the need for its development, has largely retained its relevance today.

Explaining his position, J.-P. Derrienik 36 emphasizes that since there are two main approaches to the analysis of social relations, there are two types of sociology: deterministic sociology, continuing the tradition of E. Durkheim, and the sociology of action, based on the approaches developed by M. Weber. The difference between them is rather arbitrary, because actionalism does not deny causality, and determinism is also "subjective", because it is a formulation of the researcher's intention. Its justification lies in the researcher's necessary distrust of the judgments of the people he is studying. Specifically, this difference lies in the fact that the sociology of action proceeds from the existence of reasons of a special kind that must be taken into account. These reasons for the decision, that is, the choice between many possible events, which is made depending on the existing state of information and specific evaluation criteria. The sociology of international relations is the sociology of action. It proceeds from the fact that the most essential feature of facts (things, events) is their endowment with meaning (which is associated with the rules of interpretation) and value (associated with evaluation criteria). Both depend on information. Thus, at the center of the problematics of sociology of international relations is the concept of "decision". At the same time, it should proceed from the goals that people pursue (from their decisions), and not from the goals that they should pursue, in the opinion of the sociologist (that is, from interests).

As for the second trend in French sociology of international relations, it is represented by the so-called polemology, the main provisions of which were laid down by G. Butoul and are reflected in the works of such researchers as J.-L. Annequin, R. Carrer, J. Freund, L. Poirier and others. Polemology is based on a comprehensive study of wars, conflicts and other forms of "collective aggressiveness" using methods of demography, mathematics, biology and other exact and natural sciences. The basis of polemology, writes G. Butul, is dynamic sociology. The latter is "a part of the science that studies the variations of societies, the forms they take, the factors that condition them or correspond to them, as well as the ways of their reproduction" 37. Proceeding from E. Durkheim's position on sociology as "a history comprehended in a certain way," polemology proceeds from the fact that, firstly, it was the war that gave rise to history, since the latter began exclusively as a history of armed conflicts. And it is unlikely that history will ever completely cease to be a "history of wars." Secondly, war is the main factor in that collective imitation, or, in other words, dialogue and borrowing of cultures, which plays such a significant role in social change. This is, first of all, "violent imitation": war does not allow states and peoples to lock themselves in autarchy, self-isolation, therefore it is the most energetic and most effective form of contact between civilizations. But, in addition, it is also a "voluntary imitation" associated with the fact that peoples borrow from each other types of weapons, methods of waging wars, etc. down to the fashion for military uniforms. Thirdly, wars are the engine of technological progress: for example, the desire to destroy Carthage became an incentive for the Romans to master the art of navigation and shipbuilding. And today all nations continue to exhaust themselves in pursuit of new technical means and methods of destruction, shamelessly copying each other in this. Finally, fourthly, war is the most visible of all conceivable transitional forms in social life. It is the result and source of both disturbance and restoration of balance.

Polemology should avoid a political and legal approach, bearing in mind that “politics is the enemy of sociology,” which it constantly tries to subjugate, to make its servant, just as theology did in relation to philosophy in the Middle Ages. Therefore, polemology actually cannot study current conflicts, and, therefore, the main thing for it is the historical approach.

The main task of polemology is the objective scientific study of wars as a social phenomenon that is observable just like any other social phenomenon and which at the same time is able to explain the causes of global changes in social development throughout human history. At the same time, it must overcome a number of methodological obstacles associated with the pseudo-evidence of wars; with their seeming complete dependence on the will of people (while we should talk about changes in the nature and correlation of social structures); with legal illusion, explaining the causes of wars by factors of theological (divine will), metaphysical (protection or expansion of sovereignty) or anthropomorphic (assimilation of wars to quarrels between individuals) law. Finally, polemology must overcome the symbiosis of the sacralization and politicization of wars associated with the joining of the lines of Hegel and Clausewitz.

What are the main features of the positive methodology of this “new chapter in sociology,” as G. Butul calls the polemological direction in his book (see note 37, p. 8)? First of all, he emphasizes that polemology has a truly enormous source study base for its purposes, which is rarely at the disposal of other branches of sociological science. Therefore, the main question is in what directions to carry out the classification of the innumerable facts of this huge array of documentation. Butul names eight such directions: 1) description of material facts according to the degree of their decreasing objectivity; 2) a description of the types of physical behavior, based on the ideas of the participants in the wars about their goals; 3) the first stage of the explanation: the opinions of historians and analysts; 4) the second stage of explanation: theological, metaphysical, moralistic and philosophical views and doctrines; 5) selection and grouping of facts and their primary interpretation; 6) hypotheses regarding the objective functions of war; 7) hypotheses regarding the frequency of wars; 8) the social typology of wars, that is, the dependence of the main characteristics of a war on the typical features of a particular society (see note | .37, pp. 18-25).

Based on this methodology, G. Butul puts forward and, using the methods of mathematics, biology, psychology and other sciences (including ethnomology), seeks to substantiate the classification of the causes of military conflicts proposed by him. As such, in his opinion, the following factors (according to the degree of diminishing community) act: 1) violation of the mutual equilibrium between social structures (for example, between the economy and demography); 2) the political conjuncture created as a result of such a violation (in full accordance with Durkheim's approach, they should be considered “as things”); 3) random reasons and motives; 4) aggressiveness and militant impulses as a psychological projection of psychosomatic states of social groups; 5) hostility and militant complexes ("Abraham's Complex"; "Damocles Complex"; "Goat's Sensation Complex").

In the studies of polemologists, there is an obvious influence of American modernism and, in particular, the factorial approach to the analysis of international relations. This means that these scientists are also characterized by many disadvantages of this method, the main of which is the absolutization of the role of "scientific methods" in the cognition of such a complex social phenomenon as war is justly considered to be. Such reductionism is inevitably associated with the fragmentation of the object under study, which contradicts the declared commitment to the macrosociological paradigm of polemology. The rigid determinism underlying polemology, the desire to banish accidents from among the causes of armed conflicts (see, for example, note 37) entail destructive consequences in terms of the research goals and objectives it proclaims. First, it creates distrust in its ability to make a long-term forecast about the possibility of wars and their nature. And, secondly, it leads to the actual opposition of war as a dynamic state of society to the world as a "state of order and peace" 38. Accordingly, polemology is contrasted with irenology (sociology of the world). However, in fact, the latter is deprived of its subject altogether, since “one can study the world only by studying war” (see note 37, p. 535).

At the same time, one should not lose sight of the theoretical merits of polemology, its contribution to the development of problems of armed conflicts, the study of their causes and nature. The main thing for us in this case is that the emergence of polemology played a significant role in the formation, legitimization and further development of the sociology of international relations, which found its direct or indirect reflection in the works of authors such as J. B. Durosel and R. Bosk, P. Assner and P.-M. Gallois, C. Zorgbib and F. Moreau-Defargue, J. Unzinger and M. Merle, A. Samuel, B. Badi and M.-C. Smutz and others, which we will refer to in subsequent chapters.

4. Domestic studies of international relations

Until recently, these studies were painted in one color in Western literature. Essentially, a substitution took place: if, for example, conclusions about the state of research of international relations in American or French science were made on the basis of an analysis of the dominant theoretical schools and the views of individual scientists, then the state of Soviet science was highlighted through a description of the official foreign policy doctrine of the USSR, interpretations of the corresponding Marxist attitudes that were successively replacing each other by the Soviet regimes (the regime of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, etc.) (see, for example: note 8, p. 21-23; note 15, p. 30-31). Of course, there were reasons for this: under the conditions of total pressure from the official version of Marxism-Leninism and the subordination of social disciplines to the needs of “theoretical substantiation of party policy”, scientific and publicistic literature on international relations could not but have a clearly expressed ideological orientation. Moreover, research in this area was in the zone of the closest attention of the all-powerful party authorities and state bodies. Therefore, for any research team that did not fall into the appropriate nomenclature, and even more so for a private person, professional theoretical work in this area was fraught with additional difficulties (due to the "closeness" of the necessary information) and risks (the cost of "error" could be too high). And the nomenklatura science of international relations itself had, as it were, three main levels. One of them was intended to serve the needs of the foreign policy practice of the regime (analytical notes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Committee of the CPSU and other "leading authorities") and was entrusted only to a limited number of organizations and individuals. Another was addressed to the scientific community (albeit often under the heading "DSP"). And, finally, the third was called upon to solve the tasks of propaganda among the broad masses of "the achievements of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the field of foreign policy."

And yet, as can be judged on the basis of theoretical literature, the picture was not so monotonous then. Moreover, the Soviet science of international relations had both its own achievements and theoretical tendencies that were polemics with each other. This will exchange, first of all, the fact that the Soviet science of international relations could not develop in absolute isolation from world thought. Moreover, some of its directions received a powerful inoculation from Western schools, in particular, American modernism 39. Others, proceeding from the paradigm of political realism, comprehend its conclusions taking into account domestic historical and political realities 40. Thirdly, one can find an ideological relationship with transnationalism and attempts to use its methodology to enrich the traditional Marxist approach to the analysis of international relations 41. As a result of the analysis by specialists of Western theories of international relations, a wider circle of readers also got an idea about them 42.

Nevertheless, the dominant approach was, of course, orthodox Marxism-Leninism, so elements of any other ("bourgeois") paradigm had to be either integrated into it, or, when this failed, carefully "packed" into Marxist terminology, or, finally, submitted in the form of "criticism of bourgeois ideology." This also applied to works specially devoted to the sociology of international relations.

F.M. Burlatsky, A.A. Galkin and D.V. Ermolenko. Burlatsky and Galkin consider the sociology of international relations as an integral part of political science. Noting that traditional disciplines and methods of studying international relations have proved to be insufficient and that this sphere of public life, more than any other, needs an integrated approach, they believe that systems analysis is best suited to this task. In their opinion, it is the main feature of the sociological approach, which makes it possible to consider international relations in general theoretical terms 45. The system of international relations is understood by them as a grouping of states based on the criteria of a social class, socio-economic, military-political, socio-cultural and regional order. The main one is the social-class criterion. Therefore, the main subsystems of the system of international relations are represented by capitalist, socialist and developing states. Among other types of subsystems (for example, military-political or economic), there are both homogeneous (for example, the EEC or the ATS) and heterogeneous (for example, the Non-Aligned Movement) subsystems (see note 45, pp. 265-273). The next level of the system is represented by its elements, in the role of which are foreign policy (or international) situations "the intersection of foreign policy interactions determined by time and content parameters" (see note 45, p. 273).

In addition to the above, the sociology of international relations, from the point of view of F.M. Burlatsky, is called upon to deal with such problems as: war and peace; international conflicts; optimization of international solutions; integration and internationalization processes; development of international communication; the relationship between domestic and foreign policy of the state; relations between socialist states 46.

V.D. Ermolenko, in his understanding of the discipline under consideration, also proceeded from the macrosociological paradigm, which, however, he interpreted more broadly: “both as a set of generalizations, and as a complex of concepts and methods” 47. In his opinion, the sociology of international relations is a sociological theory of the middle level, within the framework of which its own special conceptual apparatus is developed, as well as a number of private methods are created that allow for empirical and analytical research in the field of functioning, statics and dynamics of foreign policy situations, international events, factors, phenomena, etc. (see note 47, page 10). Accordingly, he singled out the following among the main problems that the sociology of international relations should deal with:

general analysis of the nature of international relations, their basic laws, main trends, correlation and role of objective and subjective factors, economic, scientific, technical, political, cultural and ideological aspects in international relations, etc. special studies of the central categories of international relations (war and peace, non-political concept, foreign policy program, strategy and tactics, main directions and principles of foreign policy, foreign policy tasks, etc.);

a special study of categories indicating the position of a state in the international arena, its class nature, state interests, strength, potential, moral and ideological state of the population, ties and degree of unity with other states, etc.

special studies of the categories and problems associated with the practical implementation of foreign policy actions: foreign policy situation; foreign policy actions; foreign policy decisions and the mechanism of their preparation and adoption; foreign policy information and methods of its generalization, systematization and use; extra-political contradictions and conflicts and ways to resolve them; international agreements and agreements, etc. study of trends in the development of international relations and internal political events and the development of probabilistic pictures for the future (forecasting) (see note 47, p11-12). The described approach laid the conceptual basis for the study of specific problems of international relations using specially developed analytical methods that take into account the achievements of American modernism.

And yet it must be admitted that the development of the domestic science of international relations, squeezed into the narrow framework of the official ideology, experienced significant difficulties. A certain liberation from this framework was seen in the doctrine of "new political thinking" proclaimed in the mid-1980s by the creators of "perestroika". That is why, for some true, very short time, tribute was paid to it even by those researchers who previously held views that were very far from its content, 49 and who subsequently subjected it to sharp criticism 50.

The starting point of the “new political thinking” was the awareness of a fundamentally new political situation in the history of mankind in the context of those global challenges that it faced by the end of the second millennium. "The basic, initial principle of the new political thinking is simple, wrote M. Gorbachev, a nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological, or any goals." Danger of nuclear war, others global problems that threaten the very existence of civilization, require a planetary, universal understanding. An important role in this is played by the understanding of the fact that the modern world is an indivisible whole, although there are different types of socio-political systems in it 52.

The statement of the integrity and interdependence of the world has led to the rejection of the assessment of the role of violence as the "midwife of history" and the conclusion that the desire to achieve a state of its own security should mean security for all. A new understanding of the relationship between power and security has also emerged. Security began to be interpreted in such a way that it can no longer be ensured by military means, but must be achieved only on the path of political settlement of the existing problems and those arising in the course of the development of interstate relations. Genuine security can be guaranteed by an increasingly lower level of strategic balance, from which it is necessary to exclude nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. International security can only be universal, equal for all, the security of one of the parties increases or decreases to the same extent as the security of the other. Therefore, peace can be preserved only by creating a system of joint security. This requires a new approach to relations between different types of socio-political systems and states, highlighting not what separates them, but what they are interested in in common. Therefore, the balance of power must give way to a balance of interests. “Life itself, its dialectics, the global problems and dangers facing humanity require a transition from confrontation to cooperation of peoples and states, regardless of their social system” 53.

The question of the relationship between class and universal human interests and values ​​was raised in a new way: it was declared the priority of the latter over the former and, accordingly, the need to de-ideologize international political, economic relations, cultural exchange, etc. Moreover, in the era of interdependence and universal values, it is not what separates them, but what unites them that comes to the fore in the interaction of states in the international arena, therefore, simple norms of morality and universal morality should be put in the basis of international relations, and these relations have been rebuilt on the basis of the principles of democratization, humanization, a new, more just world order leading to a safe, nuclear-free world (see note 51, p. 143).

Thus, the concept of “new political thinking was a significant step towards overcoming the confrontational view of the world based on the principles of opposition and struggle between two socio-political systems, the world-historical mission of socialism, etc. At the same time, this concept had a dual, contradictory character. On the one hand, she tried to combine together such incompatible things as an idealistic, normative approach to the analysis of international relations with the preservation of socialist, ultimately, class ideals 54.

On the other hand, "new political thinking" opposes "balance of power" and "balance of interests" to each other. In fact, as the history of international relations and their current state shows, the realization of national interests is the goal by which states are guided in their interactions on the world stage, while force is one of the main means on the way to achieving this goal. Both the "European Concert of Nations" in the 19th century and the "Gulf War" at the end of the 20th century show that the "balance of interests" largely depends on the "balance of power."

All these contradictions and compromises of the concept under consideration were revealed pretty soon, and accordingly, the short-term enthusiasm for it on the part of science passed, which, however, in the new political conditions, ceased to be subjected to ideological pressure, and, accordingly, needed official approval from the authorities. New opportunities have appeared for a developed sociology of international relations.

Notes (edit)

1. Hoffmann S. Theorie et relations intemationales. In: Revue francaise de Science politique. 1961 Vol. XI.p.26-27.
2. Thucydides. A History of the Penelope War in Eight Books. Translated from Greek by F.G. Mishchenko with his preface, notes and index. T.I M., 1987, p. 22.
3. Huntzinger J. Introduction aux relations intemationales. Paris, 1987, p. 22.
4. Emer be Wattel. The law of peoples or principles of natural law applied to the conduct and affairs of nations and sovereigns. M., 1960, p. 451.
5. Kant's philosophy and modernity. M., 1974, ch. Vii.
6. Marx K., Engels F. Communist Manifesto. K. Marx and F. Engels. Compositions. Ed. 2nd. T.4. M., 1955, p. 430.
7. Lenin V.I. Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Full collection op. Vol.27.
8. Martin P.-M. Introduction aux relations intemationales. Toulouse. 1982.
9. Bosc R. Sociologie de la paix. Par "s. 1965.
10. Braillard G. Theories des relations internationales. Paris, 1977.
11. Bull H. International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. In: World Politics. 1966. Vol. Xviii
12. Kuplan \ 1. A new Great Debate: Traditionalisme versus Science in International Relations. In: World Politics. 1966. Vol. Xviii
13. Modern bourgeois theories of international relations. Critical analysis. M., 1976.
14. Korani B. et coll. Analyze des relations intemationales. Approches, concepts et donnees. Montreale, 1987.
15. Colard D. Les relations intemationales. Paris, New York, Barselone, Milan, Mexico, Sao Paulo. 1987.
16. Merle M. Sociologie des relations mternationales. Paris. 1974. 17 International relations as an object of study. M., 1993, ch. 1.
17. Clare C. and Sohn L.B. World Pease tround World Law. Cambridge, Massachussets. 1960.
18. Gerard F. L, Unite federale du monde. Paris. 1971. Periller L. Demain, le gouvernement mondial? Paris, 1974; Le Mondialisme. Paris. 1977.
19. Morgenthau H.J. Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York, 1955, p. 4-12.
20. Wolfers A. Discord and Colloboration. Essays on international Politics. Baltimore, 1962.
21. W ll H. The Case for a Classical Approach. In: World Politics. 1966. Vol. XVIII.
22. Rasenau J. Lincade Politics: Essay on the Convergence of National and International System. New York. 1969.
23. Nye J.S. (Jr.). Interdependence and changing international politics // World Economy and International Relations. 1989. No. 12.
24. Laard E. International Society. London, 1990.
25. Amin S. Le Developpement inedal Paris. 1973. Emmanuel A. L "echange inegai Pans. 1975.
26. Amin S. L "accumulation a Iechelle mondiale. Paris. 1970, p. 30.
27. O "Keohane R. Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and beyond In Political Science: The State of a Discipline. Washington. 1983.
28. Waltz K. Theory of International Politics. Reading. Addison-Wesley. 1979.
29. Badie B., Smouts M.-C. Le retoumement du monde. Sociologie la scene Internationale. Paris. 1992, p. 146.
30. Merle M. Sur la "problematique" de I "etude des relations Internationales en France. In: RFSP. 1983. No. 3.
31. Tyulin I.G. Foreign policy thought of modern France. M., 1988, p. 42.
32. Aron R Memoires. 50 ans de reflexion politique. Paris, 1983, p. 69.
33. Tsygankov P.A. Raymond Aron on political science and sociology of international relations // Power and Democracy. Foreign scientists about political science. Sat. M., 1992, pp. 154-155.
34. Aron R. Paix et Guerre entre les nations. Avec une presentation inedite de I`autenr. Paris, 1984.
35. Derriennic J.-P. Esquisse de problematiqie pour une sociologie des relations intemationales. Grenoble, 1977, p. 11-16.
    The works of this Canadian scholar and follower of R. Aron (under whose guidance he wrote and defended his thesis on the problems of the sociology of international relations) rightfully belongs to the French school, although he is a professor at Lavaal University in Quebec.
36. Borthoul G. Paris. Traite de polemologie. Sociologie des querres. Paris.
37. BouthovI G., Carrere R., Annequen J.-L. Guerres et civilization. Paris, 1980
38. Analytical methods in the study of international relations. Collection of scientific papers. Ed. Tyulina I.G., Kozhemyakova A.S. Khrustaleva M.A. M., 1982.
39. Lukin V.P. "Centers of Power": Concepts and Reality. M., 1983.
40. Shakhnazarov G.Kh. Change in the balance of forces between socialism and capitalism and the problem of peaceful coexistence // The Great Victory of the Soviet People. 1941-1945.Moscow, 1975.
41. Modern bourgeois theories of international relations. Ed. Gantman V.I. M., 1976.
42. Kosolapoe R.I. The social nature of international relations // World Economy and International Relations. 1979 # 7; Podolsky N.V. International relations and class struggle. M., 1982; Lenin's foreign policy and the development of international relations. M., 1983.
43. Lenin and the Dialectics of Contemporary International Relations. Collection of scientific papers. Ed. Ashina G.K., Tyulina I.G. M., 1982.
44. Burlatsky F.M., Galkin A.A. Sociology. Politics. International relationships. M., 1974, p. 235-236.
45. Vyatr E. Sociology of political relations. M., 1970, p. 11.
46. Ermolenko D.V. Sociology and problems of international relations (some aspects and problems of sociological research of international relations). M., 1977, p. 9.
47. Khrustalev M.A. Methodological problems of modeling international relations // Analytical methods and techniques in the study of international relations. M., 1982.
48. Pozdnyakov E.A., Shadrina I.N. On humanization and democratization of international relations // World Economy and International Relations. 1989. No. 4.
49. Pozdnyakov E.A. We ourselves have ruined our house, we ourselves must raise it // World Economy and International Relations. 1992. No. 3-4.
50. Gorbachev M.S. Restructuring and new thinking for our country and for the whole world. M., 1987, p. 146.
51. Materials of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU. M., 1986, p. 6.
52. Gorbachev M.S. Socialist idea and revolutionary restructuring. M., 1989, p. 16.

Gorbachev M.S. October and perestroika: the revolution continues. M., 1987, p. 57-58.

Sometimes this trend is classified as utopianism (see for example: EH Carr. The Twenty Years of Crisis, 1919-1939. London. 1956).

In most of the textbooks on international relations published in the West, idealism as an independent theoretical direction is either not considered, or serves as nothing more than a "critical background" in the analysis of political realism and other theoretical directions.

The textbook deals with the international events of our days, testifying to the transition of mankind to a new world order. Global transformations and upheavals taking place in all spheres of public life raise more and more questions of international politics. The authors of the textbook are convinced that today it is no longer enough to consider it as the interaction of states, interstate unions and the collision of interests of great powers. The unhindered expansion of information and migration flows covering the world, the diversification of trade, socio-cultural and other exchanges, the massive invasion of non-state actors inevitably change our views on international relations. But do the ongoing changes mean that international relations are giving way to world politics? The change in the role of the state and the structure of national sovereignty in no way speaks of their disappearance, therefore, world politics should be considered in unity with international relations.

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